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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT: 
THE CASE OF KARDAK CRISIS 
Savaş, Özlem 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu 
 
 
 
 This thesis analyzes the role of national security culture in crisis management. 
The use and significance of national security culture in the management of a crisis is the 
main concern discussed throughout this study. It is assumed that national security culture 
serves as the main guideline of states during crisis management and the states manage 
crises in line with their national security culture. This can be assessed from the 
responsibility undertaken by state institutions to preserve and transfer this culture. Such 
an assessment contributes to understanding of why national security culture is reliable in 
crisis management. The case of Kardak Crisis between Turkey and Greece in 1996 is 
examined within the framework of study purpose. The thesis traces Kardak Crisis and 
seeks to answer questions such as whether the Turkish national security culture was 
influential during the management of the crisis and if so in what ways. The case is 
examined in order to make the main concern of the study more clear. 
 
Keywords: Crisis, Crisis Management, National Security Culture. 
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ÖZET 
 
MİLLİ GÜVENLİK KÜLTÜRÜNÜN KRİZ YÖNETİMİNDEKİ ROLÜ: KARDAK 
KRİZİ ÖRNEĞİ 
Savaş, Özlem 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Ali Karaosmanoğlu 
 
 
  Bu çalışma, milli güvenlik kültürünün kriz yönetimindeki rolünü incelemektedir. 
Milli güvenlik kültürünün kriz yönetimindeki rolü ve önemi çalışmada tartışılan temel 
konudur. Bu bağlamda, milli güvenlik kültürünün kriz yönetimi sırasında ülkelerin temel 
kılavuzu olduğu varsayılmaktadır. Buna göre ülkeler krizi yönetirken milli güvenlik 
kültürleri çerçevesinde hareket etmektedirler. Bu durum, milli güvenlik kültürünün 
korunup aktarılması amacı ile sorumluluk üstlenen devlet kurumlarından 
anlaşılabilmektedir. Bu anlayış, milli güvenlik kültürünün neden kriz yönetiminde ülkeler 
için güvenilir olduğunu anlamak için katkıda bulunacaktır. Çalışma, amacı 
doğrultusunda, 1996 yılında Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında ortaya çıkan Kardak 
Krizi’ni de örnek olay olarak incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, tez aynı zamanda 
Türkiye’nin milli güvenlik kültürünün bu krizde nasıl bir rolü olduğu sorusunu 
yanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır. Ele alınan örnek olay, temel tartışma konusunu netleştirmek 
amacı ile incelenmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriz, Kriz Yönetimi, Milli Güvenlik Kültürü 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One of the most debated issues with regard to international security is the role, 
capacity and efficiency of states in maintaining security both at the domestic and 
international levels. The debates generally revolve around the challenges on states in 
their ability to control and overcome the threats. The basic questions in this issue arise 
from the difficulty to define what is meant by security, what the threats are, how and 
by whom they are defined.  
The recent security studies have developed different approaches in their 
attempts to answer these questions. The multiplicity of threats ranging from inter-state 
conflicts to intra-state conflicts, emergence of non-state actors and intensification of 
globalization are usually demonstrated as the main trends and challenges on the 
sovereignty of states in controlling security-involved issues. Consequently, the 
concept of national security is in the centre of debates among both academic and 
political circles. There are views both in favor of and against the relevance of this 
concept in today’s world. Particularly, with regard to the security-involved crisis, the 
priorities of states in response to crises situations are discussed and criticized.  
The purpose of this study is to contribute to understanding the role of national 
security culture in the management of security-involved crises in international 
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relations.  In order to make this contribution, the thesis tries to answer the questions of 
how national security culture influences the way threats are defined by a state, how 
the threat perceptions are shaped according to these definitions and how the policies 
and decisions are made accordingly. Therefore, this study argues that the answers to 
these questions lie at the heart of national security culture of that state.  
The thesis focuses on the statement that national security culture serves as the 
primary guideline for states during crisis management in order to remove the threats. 
During crisis management, states act within the framework of their national security 
culture, primarily by defining the threats and then formulating the strategies. A state 
relies on its national security culture and uses it as a guideline in order to act against 
the defined threats. One or more institutions of the state undertake the responsibility 
of preserving and transferring the basic characteristics of this culture. This usually 
works through the intentional efforts of the institutions and decision makers. 
In this case, the Kardak Crisis between Turkey and Greece in 1996 is 
examined to contribute to a better comprehension of the issue. The case is studied 
from the perspective of Turkish side. How Turkey perceived the emergence of threats 
during Kardak Crisis can be answered by examining the national security culture of 
Turkey, since it is assumed that Turkey managed the crisis by considering what its 
national security culture requires it to do in such a case in order to neutralize the 
threats. Here, the military is the key institution in the management of the crisis as in 
most of the international security crises Turkey experiences. One can regard it as one 
of the basic institutions which undertake the responsibility of preserving the 
characteristics of national security culture. This will be traced from the official 
documents and declarations of the government as well as from the discourses of the 
leaders. The mechanism through which the military assumes responsibility for crisis 
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management will be examined in order to highlight the role of Turkish national 
security culture in crisis management. 
 The above mentioned thesis statement is formulated building on some of the 
recent studies on crisis, crisis management and national security culture. In doing this, 
I consider the post-Cold War trends in security studies as a framework. There are two 
main reasons why I consider the post-Cold War period. First, the selected case takes 
place in 1996. Secondly, the transformations in international order with the end of the 
Cold War has had significant impact on the understanding of the concepts of crisis, 
crisis management and national security culture which constitute the conceptual 
framework. This is especially evident in the increased number of studies on the 
challenges that states face due to the rapidly globalizing world.  
After studying on the conceptual framework and putting forward the main 
concepts with their operational meanings, the study is supported by a case study. 
There are a number of reasons why a case study is used and why particularly Kardak 
Crisis is selected. Kardak Crisis is usually regarded as one of the most important 
international crises Turkey experienced in the last decade. Moreover, Kardak Crisis 
constitutes an appropriate example with the ways it emerged between Turkey and 
Greece in terms of recalling the history of relations between these two states and the 
basic premises of Turkish national security culture.  
There are both advantages and limitations of using case study methods in 
international security studies. While they help to analyze “causal relations” and to 
make “detailed explanations of particular cases”, the problems of “case-selection 
bias” and high degree of parsimony resulting from small number of variables or cases 
are among the limitations of case studies (Kacowicz, 2003: 107-108). If the researcher 
selects the case which matches the purpose of study and which is the most appropriate 
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for testing the hypotheses (Van Evera, 1997:78), the challenge of such problems 
would be minimal. Within this context, Kardak Crisis is selected by considering both 
the advantages and limitations of this method.  
The thesis intends to point out the significance of national security culture for 
the states in the current international relations, particularly in times of crises. 
Although it is possible to formulate policy recommendations or criticize the 
formulated policy recommendations drawn upon the role of national security culture 
in crisis management, such an outlook does not fall into the scope of this study. The 
aim of this study is to point out the intentional or unintentional use of national 
security culture by states as a guideline in crisis management in order to define and 
remove the threats. Moreover, understanding why and how national security culture is 
used as a guideline by states in crisis management can contribute to the policy and 
decision makers, to those who study on this issue or to those who criticize the policies 
built on national security culture.  
In Chapter II, I describe the analytical and conceptual framework of the thesis. 
I explain each of the key concepts of the study, crisis, crisis management and national 
security culture in different sections by giving reference to some of the recent studies. 
After elaborating on some of the perspectives in understanding these concepts, I use 
the terms with their operational meanings in line with the purpose of this study. 
In Chapter III, I try to explain the national security culture of Turkey by 
focusing on the dominant views on this topic. First, I discuss the brief background 
information on the factors influential in the formation and evolution of Turkish 
national security culture. I concentrate on the Historical Experiences as one of these 
factors. The conditions before and during the establishment of the Republic of Turkey 
as well as the atmosphere of the Cold War and the post-Cold War period are 
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important because they constitute the roots of certain threat perceptions which are still 
evident today and which emerge particularly in crises times. After that, I focus on the 
national identity as a driver of Turkish national security culture. In doing this, I 
explain the role of NATO membership as a choice of the state in building up its 
national identity and the role of the military in terms of its responsibility to preserve 
the main characteristics of Turkish national security culture and its expertise with 
regard to external security matters.  
In Chapter IV, I examine the case of Kardak Crisis in two sections. In the first 
section, I briefly explain the Aegean disputes in order to understand the case better 
since it determines the approach of Turkey to the crisis to a great extent. The 
historical background of these disputes as well as the attitude of Turkey in balancing 
its interests in the Aegean is the main concern. In the second section, I explain the 
case descriptively by focusing on the emergence and development of the crisis. I 
briefly review the crisis in terms of its elements in order to understand how national 
security culture was influential in controlling these elements and thus managing the 
crisis.  
In the last chapter of the thesis, I summarize the conclusions drawn out from 
the study as a whole and discuss the main result as the concluding remark. I discuss 
how Turkey managed the crisis and how it tried to balance between different elements 
of its national security culture. Although it seems difficult to measure the degree 
Turkey attaches importance to its national security culture with regard to this case, the 
basic documents and declarations released as a result of the crisis and the chain of 
events following the emergence of the crisis give an idea about the role of Turkish 
national security culture in Kardak Crisis. I also point out the difficulties and the 
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limitations I encounter during my research and studies in order to clarify the possible 
barriers in such studies and to contribute to further studies.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
 ANALYTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
2.1  Crisis and Crisis Management 
The studies focus on different aspects of crisis and crisis management as the 
conditions of the international order change and different types of crises emerge. The 
states prefer to update or reformulate their strategies and tools in order to adapt to 
these conditions. During this adaptation process, the purposes of states during crisis 
management are usually based on preserving their interests. In this study, I use the 
concepts of crisis and crisis management considering this aspect of the issue.  
 
2.1.1. Definition of crisis and its constitutive elements 
There are different definitions for crisis. Similar to most of the significant 
concepts of social sciences, there is not a definition which is commonly accepted 
because the researchers usually define the concepts in line with their methodological 
perspectives or the focus of concern in their studies (Lebow, 1984:7). Following this 
tendency, I put forward my definition of crisis and how I use the concept in line with 
the purpose of this study after pointing out some of the definitions.  
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By its nature, a crisis emerges “with little or no warning” (Youngson, 2001: 
52). The crisis situation for a state can also be defined as the existence of “a threat to 
one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the 
value threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities” 
(Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997: 3). Crisis is also defined as “a sequence of 
interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe 
conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of a dangerously high 
probability of war” (Synder and Diesing, 1977: 6). Crisis is commonly defined as a 
turning point when decisions are made by states (Bell, 1971: 6; Tayfur, 1994: 137). In 
a crisis situation “an (unanticipated) threat is directed to high priority goals of a state 
which in turn require action in a short time” (Tayfur, 1994: 137). Crises can also be 
defined as “the outgrowth of national and international developments whose roots 
may go back years”. In this sense, “each crisis is rooted in a particular historical 
context from which it cannot be divorced without losing much of its meaning” 
(Lebow, 1981:4, 23). Thus, it can be argued that “the shape of a crisis is determined 
by its history” (Zartman, 1988:199). 
In many definitions, there are some common characteristics such as threat 
perceptions, high level of anxiety on the side of decision-makers, the probability of 
violence, the assumption that vital decisions need to be taken, the existence of 
incomplete information, a stressful environment, and time limitation. As a result of 
such characteristics, decision-making in a crisis differs from a normally formulated 
foreign policy situation (Lebow, 1981:8-9, 12, 269). For this reason, the crisis 
management requires a particular concern for states who would like to preserve their 
interests in such a vulnerable environment.  
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Within the framework of these characteristics, there are some constitutive 
elements of a crisis situation. These include the historical roots of the crisis, the 
existence of a threat to the national interests of the state, the necessity to respond in a 
limited time, the probability of a military conflict and the need for preserving the 
interests or the position within the region/international system. The states recognize 
these elements and try to control them while managing the crises. Throughout this 
study, I use the term crisis referring to an international security crisis where a state 
attempts to immediately thwart the perceived threat to its pre-determined vital 
interests in order to exist within the international system in line with its priorities and 
conditions. I try to demonstrate that states rely on their national security culture while 
doing this. 
 
2.1.2. Crisis management studies 
The descriptive analysis of crises rather than an analytical one rarely provides 
a convincing idea about crisis management and the nature of crises (Gilbert and 
Lauren, 1980: 642). The concept of crisis has been intensively discussed among 
scholars whereas the concept of crisis management has not attracted that much 
attention. This seems to be related to the variety of objectives sought by decision 
makers in a crisis (Richardson, 1988:14, 16). In general, crisis management can be 
defined as “the practice of attempting to avoid an outcome in interstate relations that 
leads to violence or war, without abandoning at the same time one’s position” 
(Winham, 1988: ix). There has been an increasing interest on crisis management 
particularly in the universities, agendas of governments and NATO, where special 
budgets and departments are established working on the topic. Such an interest was 
 10
initially inflamed with the Cuban missile crisis in the Cold War when the superpower 
conflict was at the peak (Lebow, 1981: 291). 
During the Cold War, most of the research and studies on the behavior of 
states during crisis management have usually focused on accumulating data, 
formulating and testing hypotheses about the impact of stress on decision makers 
during times of crises, discovering regular patterns concerning the activities of 
superpowers and the role of international organizations, drawing conclusions from 
past experiences for the sake of peace and order (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997:1). 
Towards the end of the Cold War, crisis management studies were regarded as “one 
of the most interesting and exciting developments in the field of international 
relations” by some scholars. These studies were attributed a role which would 
contribute to better policy making (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980: 641). There are multiple 
variables involved in the development and outcomes of crises. Each crisis has its own 
context with different variables. Given such an outlook, it is difficult to put forward a 
concrete theory of crisis management which would explain regular and alternative 
behavior and interaction patterns in order to predict whether a particular crisis will 
end with success or failure (George, 1991:23-24). The huge number of different crises 
in international relations also prevents the analysts to make generalizations about 
crisis management (Winham, 1988:4). 
One of the concerns about crisis management in the post-Cold War is the 
decreased tension due to the low probability of a global war (Youngson, 2001: 47). 
Instead, during the chain of events in a crisis, leaders come across a number of 
challenges on national or individual interests (Lebow, 1981:5). Such a change seems 
to have an encouraging effect on the states to act according to their national interests 
since they are no longer bound with the influence of superpowers.  
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The literature on crisis usually focuses on material concerns and capabilities of 
the actors in managing the crisis, whereas the role of cultural factors in crisis 
management are underestimated. Crisis management literature usually does not touch 
upon national security culture directly. On the other hand, crisis management is often 
explained with reference to national interests and the security of that state. For this 
reason, in examining the security-involved crises, it seems useful to consider the 
cultural factors particularly those that fall into the category of national security 
culture. These cultural factors can be examined within the framework of national 
interests and security. It can be argued that national security culture serves as a 
guideline for states in two ways. Firstly, through the intentional efforts of institutions 
or top level decision makers. They may do this either for the sake of preserving and 
transferring the national security culture or for benefiting from the basic elements of 
this culture even through a manipulation of these elements for legitimizing their 
behaviors.  Secondly, in a spontaneous way by influencing the behavior of the actors 
through cognitive processes. Therefore, if we approach crises from this perspective, it 
might be possible to find out, or at least have an opinion on the role of national 
security culture in crisis management process. 
 
2.1.3. National interests in crisis management 
Since the emergence of states, one of the unchanged characteristics of 
“national behavior” is that states continue to act according to their national interests. 
Whatever the type of international order, for states, the top priority has been their 
national interests in their relations with other actors. Those actions which are not 
compatible with the national interests risk the national security of that state. 
Moreover, in terms of the duties of a state, national interests need to be considered. In 
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this sense, the international crises are managed according to the national interests of 
states (Youngson, 2001: 39-40).  
The management of crises by any state directly involves the considerations of 
national interests rather than acting for the benefit of international community, no 
matter what the formal declarations of states put forward in favor of ethical concerns 
(Youngson, 2001: 49). When a crisis starts, the sides feel obliged to do “what is 
needed to protect or advance its most important interests” (George, 1991:23). The 
basic driving force and the aimed outcome during a crisis management is to make 
gains for the sake of national interests (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980:645). There is a need 
to study on this point as “national security is best enhanced by devoting most of our 
attention to the diverse elements of management” (Young, 1977:8). 
While managing crises, decision makers tend to base their decisions on 
previous experiences and memories in order to determine their actions, since the lack 
of information required cannot be overcome easily and solely through the advice of 
experts or gathering intelligence. At this point, the common memories of people, 
including policy-makers, media personnel and the communities enter into scene 
(Brandström, Hart, et al., 2004: 191, 193) recalling for instance, the relations between 
the two states that are parties to that crisis. Therefore, the significance of historical 
experiences, perceptions and belief systems in crisis management is revealed in this 
situation. Thus, states would try to base their actions upon the basic drivers of its 
security culture in relation to that particular crisis. 
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2.1.4. The source of perceptions in crisis management 
During crisis management, the information at the hand of states are usually 
interpreted in line with the dominant beliefs whether they are rational or irrational, 
since there is a time limitation and stress which may avoid the flow of sufficient and 
relevant information (Forsberg and Pursiainen, 2006: 252). With the stress of the 
crisis, decision makers’ perceptions direct them to act differently compared to normal 
situations (Tayfur, 1994: 137). Since a crisis occurs abruptly, necessitates immediate 
decisions, threatens the interests and gives birth to many uncertainties, it is sometimes 
regarded as a frightening issue to deal with (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980: 642). In this 
sense, it is very likely that states would prefer to apply to their so-called guidelines, to 
their national security culture which shapes the perceptions and the belief system. 
This mostly emerges from the need for a reliable source in making decisions for 
taking actions during crisis management. 
It is usually assumed that states act rationally while they are making decisions 
during a crisis in order to choose the best alternative of actions, which is called the 
rational actor paradigm. Nevertheless, a considerable number of research demonstrate 
that in practice this is not always the case. The process is much more complicated as a 
result of multiple “personal, political, institutional, and cultural considerations” 
shaping the decisions. This may lead to certain misperceptions or problems in 
processing the information received during a crisis. In psychological approaches, an 
example of the latter is cognitive consistency which makes people “keep their beliefs, 
feelings, actions, and cognitions mutually consistent” (Lebow, 1981, 101-102). The 
decision makers usually interpret the national interest in conformity with their values, 
interests and objectives (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980:653). “It is through culture that 
anything we might call ‘interests’ is constructed” as Banerjee (1997: 29) argues. The 
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policy makers of a state are socialized differently from those of another state as the 
cultural contexts and consequently the choices in a same situation differ. The societies 
they live in have different assumptions and perceptions about the world, which help 
define the threats and interests compared to other states’. National interests and 
policies are defined by Latham (1998:129-130) as “social constructions that derive 
their meanings out of the inter-subjective and culturally established representations 
through which foreign policy officials make sense of the world”. 
 Most of the scholarly works on this issue may lead one to regard such a trend 
in decision-making as distorting the pace of events or the received information. 
Nevertheless, such a tendency seems inevitable. Because, states act according to the 
decisions made by policy-makers who are socialized in a given society where a set of 
cultural norms are inherent. Thus, it can be argued that during times of crises the 
states act in accordance with the assumptions shaped by threat perceptions which 
emerge through the established beliefs and historical experiences. 
The psychology of perceptions needs to be considered carefully in 
understanding the underlying reasons of political behavior (Smoke, 1991:56). During 
a crisis, the policy makers need to understand “the nature and degree of threats to their 
country’s interests”. Either intentionally or unintentionally, they interpret the 
situations at a crisis through systematically developed beliefs about the image of the 
adversary, the forces about the escalation of crisis and the ways of controlling it, and 
the rules of bargaining to resolve the crisis in line with the interests of the country. 
These beliefs are called crisis bargaining codes which can also be regarded as a 
cognitive prism. These beliefs may not work in exactly the same way in each crisis 
and the application of strategies by policy makers may differ (Rogers, 1991: 413-
414). From the perspective of cognitive dimension, the decision makers from different 
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cultural environments and geographies require more information in order to process it 
relying on their experience which will serve as a guide while choosing an option 
(Brecher, 1993: 537-538). In other words, the states try to control the elements of the 
crisis through this cognitive prism/crisis bargaining codes. These codes are 
formulated as a part of security culture of that state. 
Concerning crisis management, the role national character deserves particular 
attention. This concept is usually attached a negative meaning referring to the 
prejudices of a researcher and the crude stereotypes rather than the character of the 
people or the nation studied. The character of a nation usually determines roles, the 
attitudes which differ from one state to another. In this sense, it has a significant 
impact on policy during crisis management. The national self-images are shaped 
according to the national character and they are based on an “idea or principle that is 
concrete, tangible, and readily understandable to members of the nationality” as 
Lebow puts it (1981: 193-195, 197). The national character has its roots in the 
historical experiences which penetrate into the formation of national identity and 
foreign policy thinking of the state. 
This point becomes clearer when the national security culture which is based 
on history, culture, norms, etc. is discussed in more detail in the next section. No 
matter how past influences the quality of decisions, it may serve as a constraint, but 
the decision makers rely on their perceptions, experiences and belief system, thus, 
intentionally or unintentionally, take national security culture as the guideline in crisis 
management. The main purposes of crisis management determine what is meant by 
successful crisis management for states. Naturally, a state wants to preserve its 
interests during crises times as in general. Here, the point is how national security 
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culture contributes to the success of crisis management or why states rely on it as a 
guideline during the hard times of crisis.  
 
2.2  National Security Culture 
The concept of national security culture has been studied by many scholars up 
to now. Since it is composed of the words of “national”, “security”, and “culture”, it 
deserves a careful examination within the framework of this study. Moreover, again 
there is a need to point out different perspectives which attempt to explain what 
national security culture is. 
 
2.2.1 The studies on the concept of national security 
The post-Cold War period has been witnessing an increasing number of 
studies on broadening the conceptualization of security moving beyond its narrow 
definitions (Katzenstein, 1996a: 8-9; Katzenstein, 1996b: 3) which mainly focus on 
“material capacity and the use and control of military force by states” (Walt, 
1991:212). States have been reevaluating their security strategies, particularly in terms 
of internal security, considering this comprehensive understanding of security by 
integrating different aspects of security such as, social, economic, political, and 
ecological. Nevertheless, concerning the military issues, more traditional security 
strategies remain as the basics of decisions (Katzenstein, 1996b: 6). In other words, 
particularly in international security issues or crises, traditional outlooks still seem to 
be dominant. This leads to the idea that during times of crises, due to the urgency of 
the issue at hand, the states would resort to traditionally established security 
strategies. 
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Globalization has been affecting the national security state in different ways, 
both positively and negatively (Paul, 2005: 49; Booth, 2005: 32). Particularly, since 
the end of the Cold War, the factors influencing national security have increased to 
include culture, identities, and norms. The interests of states in security matters have 
been increasingly shaped by the responses of actors to cultural factors (Katzenstein, 
1996a: 2). This implies that the states do not exist merely within a material security 
environment, but also within a cultural one which affects the incentives as the source 
of different state behaviors (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996: 33). 
 The questions on the structure of the international system and the sources of 
conflicts between states necessitated a search on alternative explanations of security 
issues (Katzenstein, 1996a: 3-4). In this sense, there have been challenges to the 
conceptualization of national security. The post-Cold War context emerging with the 
disappearance of superpower conflict and its effects on the international relations, the 
intense effects of globalization as well as the increasing consciousness of people 
about the meaning of security with regard to their definitions of identity constitute the 
basis for the development of alternative approaches to security. 
The term national security usually covers issues related to both domestic and 
international security and the national interests of a state are closely associated with 
the national security of that state (Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, 2002: 7, 11). The 
recent studies on national security have pointed out the significance and the role of 
social factors, particularly the constructed identity of states and the cultural context as 
the hitherto undermined determinants of national security policies (Katzenstein, 
1996a: 4-5). 
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In security studies, the issue of referent objects deserves particular attention. 
Ken Booth (1991: 319) argues that states are clearly significant features of world 
politics, but they can not be regarded as “the primary referent objects for a 
comprehensive theory of security”. He claims that some states are not interested in 
security while others use it as a means for its own security rather than the end to 
provide security to its people. Moreover, states are “too diverse in their character” and 
this leads to the argument that “a theory of state is misplaced” moving away from the 
interests of its own people. For him, the question of whose security should be 
answered in favor of people rather than the state and he regards national security as a 
top-down process (Booth, 1991: 319-320). 
Barry Buzan argues that each state has a different national security problem. 
For this reason there is no universal definition for national security. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to analyze the national security of states by distinguishing weak and strong 
states. This distinction is made according to “the degree of socio-political cohesion”. 
For Buzan, weak states exist only with their physical base and with the recognition of 
other states. They do not have “a widely accepted and coherent idea of the state 
among their populations” nor the ability to provide unity when political consensus 
disappears. On the other hand, strong states are not threatened from within, because 
they have a clear and stable “idea of state” with a “coherent national identity”. 
Therefore, in strong states, it would be easier to maintain individual and national 
security together. Consequently, this would contribute to international security 
(Buzan, 1991: 96-107). 
Such a distinction of weak and strong states made by Buzan may help us 
understand the reasons why states would choose to regard security as a means for its 
existence. It seems that the criticisms on the security policies of states which give 
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priority to their national security are focused on weak states rather than strong ones. 
Nevertheless, this does not invalidate the role of national security for states, since the 
concept of national security, in its nature does not exclude the duty of state in 
providing “socio-political cohesion” and security for its citizens. Moreover, after 
9/11, it is difficult to claim that national security is a priority merely for weak states. 
We can regard the US, as a strong state which gives utmost importance to its national 
security. In other words, national security is a central concept for all states, no matter 
whether they are weak or strong states. 
Furthermore, the concept of national security inherently refers and serves to 
the security of the members of that state as it helps to overcome ethnic, racial, and 
class differences and provides “an extraordinary degree of unity” (Lebow, 1981: 197-
198). In other words, it is true that states exist in order to provide security and order 
for its citizens, however, the abuse of state power by political leaders should not lead 
to a negative understanding about the idea of state and national security, which 
inherently requires the preservation of individual interests. We should comprehend 
the criticisms upon the concept of national security within this context. 
 
2.2.2 The concept of culture in security studies 
The concept of culture has various definitions. In general, it is usually referred 
to as “collectively held semi-conscious or unconscious images, assumptions, ‘codes’, 
and ‘scripts’ which define the external environment” and it “consists of shared 
assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group 
conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political 
environment” (Johnston, 1995: 44-45). It inherently accommodates many other 
concepts such as “attitudes, beliefs, … conceptual models, feelings, ideas, images, 
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knowledge, … , mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, symbols, values, world 
views” which are shared by a certain group (Duffield, 1999a: 769).  
The concept can also be defined in terms of its relation to foreign policy and 
security issues. According to Gray (1990: 45), it “refers to the socially transmitted 
habits of mind, traditions, and preferred methods of operations that are more or less 
specific to a particular geographically based security community”.  Although, there is 
a common belief that it is difficult to define culture, it is related to how the concept is 
applied and operationalized (Hudson, 1997: 15-17; Desch, 1998: 152). The concept 
should be defined by emphasizing the “collectively held ideas that do not vary in the 
face of environmental or structural changes”. In addition, the “ideas should be 
particular to individual states, rather than held commonly across the international 
system” (Desch, 1998: 152). There might exist a number of cultures within a state, 
however usually there is “a dominant culture whose holders are interested in 
preserving the status-quo” (Johnston, 1995: 45). All members of a society may not 
share all aspects of the dominant culture; however this does not necessarily mean the 
irrelevance or inexistence of a dominant culture which is particularly shared among 
the elites (Latham, 1998: 156). According to some, culture “denotes collective models 
of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law” and it “refers to both a 
set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards 
(such as rules and models)” defining the actors and their behaviors in a system 
(Katzenstein, 1996a: 6). 
The studies on cultural dimensions of international politics use different 
concepts of culture such as political, diplomatic, and strategic culture. These elements 
can be examined within a single concept of security culture. The diplomatic culture in 
general “refers to the rules of conduct that govern the interactions of state 
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representatives in formal and informal contexts”. They “include specific procedures 
and protocols, the use of a particular terminology in agreements and more general 
‘signals’ between states”. The decision-makers are aware of the diplomatic culture of 
other states during negotiations or security agreements and they behave accordingly. 
The political culture of a state is a reflection of its “domestic political arrangements 
and traditions” as the “political outcomes … [and] the external expressions or 
projections”. The strategic culture of a state builds on “the tradition of political 
culture, but turns it towards a specific set of issues concerning war and military”. 
Drawing on these three dimensions of culture, the concept of security culture acquires 
significance in understanding the security interests shaped by historical, social and 
cultural experiences of states. A common definition for security culture can point out 
“enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the 
ways in which a state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability 
and peace are perceived … by political actors and elites”.  This definition is useful for 
understanding how cultural factors may determine the “complex calculations of 
material capabilities or interests” underlying the policies. In this sense, culture should 
be understood in its own context in order to assess the relevance of certain influences 
in particular regions or issues (Krause, 1998: 3-11, 14). 
 
2.2.3  The explanatory power of culture in security studies 
There has been a growing interest in the studies linking the national security 
issues with culture (Oren, 2000: 543; Krause, 1998: 1). Although the interdependency 
between states has been rapidly increasing, the cultural factors are stable sources of 
foreign policy (Tassell, 1997: 234). The interest in incorporating culture into security 
studies has increased and the state behaviors have become to be explained with 
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cultural outlooks (Johnston, 1995: 33). Many scholars1 studying culture in security 
studies think that culture by focusing on ideational factors explains the world better 
than the realism does in international relations. Here, the crucial question is whether 
cultural theories should be considered as contributing to and enlarging our 
understanding of security issues or as a new way of thinking superseding the 
dominant approach in security studies, namely the realist paradigm. The former view 
suggests that the cultural explanations should be regarded as a supplement to the 
current theories in national security. It is because they can help to understand the 
irrational behaviors of states and their failures to adapt to the constraints of the 
international system from time to time. Moreover, the domestic cultural variables 
have a high explanatory power and impact during “structurally indeterminate 
situations”. In this sense, the culture seems to have an explanatory power mostly as an 
intervening, rather than an independent causal variable (Desch, 1998: 141, 166, 170).  
Whether cultural variables have “observable effect on behavior” is among the 
debated issues. The relationship between the values of a particular culture and 
behavior of a state increases as the decision makers during times of crises act 
according to those values in which they are socialized, no matter their choices are 
constrained or they manipulate the cultural values. This relationship often remains 
                                                 
1 Some of these scholars are cited by Desch (1998:141-142) : “Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996), … Peter J. Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, 
and Policies,” International Security 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), 84-118; … International Security 17, 
No. 4 (Spring 1993), 119-150; Jeffrey W. Legro, “Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World 
War II,” International Security 18, No. 4 (Spring 1994), 108-142; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking 
about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), 32-64; Elizabeth Kier, 
“Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars,” International Security 19, No. 4 (Spring 
1995), 65-93; Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War 
II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Alistair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic 
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); 
Jeffrey W. Legro, “Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step,” American 
Political Science Review 90, No. 1 (March 1996), 118-137; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and 
National Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); … Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military 
Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp 23 and 24.” 
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vague in the sense that it is difficult to prove a “one-to-one correspondence between 
cultural forms and observable decisions” (Johnston, 1995: 40, 42-44). It seems 
difficult to observe and prove the impact of cultural factors on information-processing 
during decision-making in foreign policy. Nevertheless, this does not prove that they 
have little influence (Vertzberger, 1990: 261). Moreover, it is still possible to trace 
“the basic contours of the dominant security culture” in order to discover the “hidden 
cultural premises” behind the policies of a state (Latham, 1998: 130).  
In explaining the behavior and actions of states, culture can have a strong 
explanatory power. Similar to national traditions and norms, culture shapes the 
behavior of states by determining the military strategies and by defining who they are 
and what they should do (Farrel, 1998: 408, 416). States have different preferences 
which have their roots in the establishment of that state and are affected by its 
cultural, cognitive, philosophical, and political characteristics. The material conditions 
acquire meaning with the culture of that state. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that culture opposes rationality. In different cultures, the interpretation of a 
strategic reality differs due to different socialization processes of the actors (Johnston, 
1995: 34-35). Consequently, as Katzenstein (1996b: 11) argues, the definition and 
pursuit of security objectives differ for each state. Therefore, we can argue that 
national security culture matters. 
There are different cultural approaches in security studies since the Cold War 
period. Consequently, there exist different variables that the scholars focus on while 
they are explaining national security. As it is often difficult to define these variables 
and operationalize them, the cultural approach is criticized due to its low explanatory 
power. Since the cultural variables are peculiar to the specific case which they 
explain, it seems difficult to apply and test them in a broad range of cases. Although 
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cultural variables may not provide a general theory explaining the behavior of all 
states, they may explain the foreign policy behavior of a particular state (Desch, 1998: 
142-143, 150, 155). The cultural differences help us understand different paths in 
certain policy issues and reflect different motivations or their contexts (Krause: 1998: 
2). As long as the behaviors are observed, it is possible to make predictions which can 
be tested according to a sui generic culture (Duffield, 1999b: 158).  
Operationalizing the concept of culture in restrictive terms and focusing on the 
variables under scrutiny would make it possible to reach convincing cultural 
explanations and decrease the vagueness (Gaenslen, 1997: 273). In this sense, when 
the national security culture is concerned, it restricts the term of culture into its 
components regarding the security understanding of that state, particularly in its 
relations with other states and international actors. These components would naturally 
vary from culture to culture depending on the characteristics of a particular state. I 
define the concept of national security culture as a set of characteristics, values and 
priorities shaping the nation-wide security thinking and policies through the legacies 
of the past and inherent within the state structures and the minds of people. 
 
2.2.4  The basic drivers of national security culture 
2.2.4.1 Historical Experiences 
It is not very convincing that globalization leads to a homogenization of 
cultural and social spheres as history demonstrates that the security communities 
evaluate their options through their own cultural and social contexts as well as their 
existent geostrategic and geopolitical conditions. In this sense, “history is the only 
guide available”, although most of the people hesitate to accept this as a truth and 
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even expect to manage the security issues more peacefully (Gray, 2005: 386-387, 
396). Such a view merely distorts the fact that today states do not behave independent 
from their histories, which is also reflected in their national security culture. 
Some scholars assume that political issues can be analyzed without 
considering historical and cultural elements shaping a society despite the existence of 
studies which draw attention to the significance of “historical experience” in 
examining the nature of international crises (Lebow, 1981: ix-x). The cultural 
explanations usually challenge the “structural explanations of choice” which are based 
on “a-historical calculations of interests and capabilities”, though their conclusions 
may also support each other.  
Despite the existence of a high number of studies on culture in security 
studies, they appear to be under theorized. For this reason, there are different views on 
the degree of determinism of cultural explanations which may appear at the extremes. 
Whatever the shortcomings these studies may experience, the possible implications of 
“values and assumptions with roots deep in a state’s ideational history” on state 
behavior is attractive enough both in theoretical terms and in policy means (Johnston, 
1995: 63). The security culture involves “a set of widely resonating ideas that have 
evolved out of a long historical experience and that are deeply rooted in the shared 
consciousness or ‘common sense’” (Latham, 1998: 132). This is a fertile ground to 
encourage further studies on security matters from this perspective. 
The turning points in the history of a state, the existence of a “heroic history”, 
the “founding of the state”, the existence and type of “colonizing experience” can be 
counted among the elements shaping the core beliefs inherent in the cultural roots of 
that state. The turning point events may modify the existing beliefs about the role of 
that state or nation at international sphere. The existence of a heroic history would 
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lead to the belief that the state can determine its own fate and can be an effective 
international actor. If the establishment of the state is based on heroic acts performed 
by national leaders, a similar perception would be dominant in the minds of decision 
makers as the national legacy. Whether the state has ever been colonized or had 
colonies during its history also makes a difference in the values and responsibilities of 
the decision makers. Such variables can be empirically studied by focusing on the 
actions and rhetoric of decision makers. Their emphasis on certain matters reveals 
“the degree to which particular axiomatic beliefs guide decision makers”. Within this 
context, those decision makers who are cognizant of the cultural values influential in 
the foreign policy of another state would negotiate and communicate more effectively. 
Thus, if applied cautiously, the cultural variables make a valuable contribution to 
other explanations in understanding the foreign policy behavior of a state (Breuning, 
1997: 110-115, 119-120). 
 
2.2.4.2 National identity  
The national identity involves “a heritage that traces the nation’s cultural and 
ethnic genesis”. This “cultural genesis” determines the heritage carried through 
generations. This heritage describes “critical strengths and foundations for exclusive 
unity” as well as the “distinctive weaknesses and vulnerabilities” of that nation. The 
realization of the destiny of the nation requires the pursuit of that heritage. In this 
sense, those who contribute to this aim are regarded as friends; “those who deny that 
heritage” and challenge it are rivals. When the nation comes across a danger, it 
should not fail to do what its heritage requires in order not to be defeated by its 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities (Banerjee, 1997: 33-34). This understanding 
influences the formation of national security culture of a state. A state determines its 
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position in the international system according to its national identity. In other words, 
the way state defines itself with respect to the others in the system is reflected in its 
foreign policy orientation. This choice is usually inter-related with the historical 
experiences of that state. 
The security culture of a state is also shaped by the dynamics of the 
international system and the common perceptions in the regional context that the state 
is situated within. It can change over time through modifications, manipulations and 
adaptations. States may intentionally preserve certain traditions and let others alter. 
For this reason, security culture is not merely a “product of history and socialization 
but of political and social choice” (Latham, 1998: 133,154).  
 Since strategic and political culture is “the product of a particular national 
historical experience which has been shaped by a more or less unique, though not 
necessarily unvarying geographical context”, the location of that state and its 
neighbors are also significant in the formulation of strategies (Gray, 1990: 49-50). 
Because, the historical relations of a state with other states, particularly with the 
neighbors; the preferences of the state in integration with certain alliances within the 
international system and the national identity influence the security culture of that 
state.  
 
2.2.5 The use of national security culture in understanding state behavior 
Culture helps us understand the preferences of states (Wildavsky, 1987: 3). 
The statements of high level decision makers give an idea about the vision and 
interpretation of the world events revealing certain patterns of the role the state has 
undertaken as a part of its national culture (Chafetz, Abramson and Grillot, 1997: 
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184-185, 193). The elements to be traced as a reflection of cultural factors in national 
security decisions of a state, particularly in crisis management, can be determined 
according to the specific case under examination. It seems relevant that the researcher 
should look for the evidences of dominant elements of the national security culture of 
that state while studying on the actions and discourses of top level decision makers 
and leaders, within the country.  
The use of cultural explanations would differ according to how they are 
applied by states. If analyzed well, the cultural explanations may give a clear idea 
about the different perceptions of actors in the same game played, which would 
reduce problems and uncertainties in taking decisions. On the other hand, a 
problematic analysis would lead to invalid or wrongly-formulated stereotypes about 
the other, which would reduce policy options of that state as well as the possible 
security alliances. Because, the cultural explanations, in essence do not necessarily 
lead to a conclusion that cultural differences are a source of disputes or disagreements 
between states (Johnston, 1995: 63-64; Krause, 1998: 4-7). Rather, they should be 
regarded as a source of mutual understanding between different actors and creating 
empathy. This would pave the way for further opportunities of agreements, trust and 
understanding in international security.  
Hudson (1997: 18) argues that it is important to think of the conditions when 
culture plays “a more pivotal role in national behavior”. When a state or a nation feels 
threatened, it acts against those threats considering the culturally acceptable modes of 
behavior. During turbulent times and in the case of considerable uncertainties, the 
cultural explanations are expected to be more convincing (Gaenslen, 1997: 270). 
Therefore, this is a point for more investigation on the influence of culture on state 
behavior and foreign policy in crisis times. 
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In times of crises, states may demand sacrifices enforced on individuals in 
order to survive and this may go beyond “pure rationality” and require a recalling of 
societal memories or even myths in which the nation situates its existence. There may 
even be failures; however, the nation is inclined to behave in line with their 
perceptions and interpretations of the world and to feel the satisfaction of taking a 
decision compatible with its own foundation. For this reason, the political actors may 
want to manipulate the public opinion through the core beliefs within the society 
(Lotz, 1997: 75-79, 92). Even in this case such a manipulation and the basis of 
decisions take their legitimacy or reliability from such cultural elements, which in 
turn demonstrate the role of culture on state behavior. 
It can be argued that it is useful to incorporate cultural explanations into the 
research programs of security studies. This would lead to more fertile ground in 
security studies (Farrell, 1999: 168). The approaches ignoring social factors close the 
way for further “empirical research and theoretical insight” which are necessary for 
explaining certain aspects of national security (Katzenstein, 1996a: 7). In this sense, 
most scholars agree on the point that cultural dimension matters in explaining 
“particular security policies” (Krause, 1998: 2). 
It is important to benefit from different and seemingly opposite perspectives 
on security studies, for instance one studying “the social determinants of national 
security policy”, the other adopting “a traditional, narrow definition of security 
studies”. This would pave the way for dealing with complex issues of security. The 
interest of rationalists in cultural explanations seems to be related to such an 
understanding as cross-paradigm debates contribute to our understanding much more 
than those involving common perspectives. Thus, a more promising analytical 
perspective includes culture among the important factors which “define the interests 
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and constitute the actors that shape national security policies” (Katzenstein, 1996a: 
10-11, 527, 537). Gray (1990: 79) argues that in the formulation of national security 
policies and decision-making particularly in strategic matters, the two approaches 
work simultaneously, one historical and the other is materialist, while the former 
constitutes a source for inspiration, the latter determines the performance.  
Therefore, national security culture is in a sense “the source for inspiration”. 
For this reason, the states may assume that it is as a reliable guide during crisis 
management. One can trace the evidences of this argument within the discourses of 
decision makers as well as the official documents and declarations of the state, the 
decisions made and the results of the crisis. The point is to understand to what extent 
the basic elements of national security culture are resorted before taking actions, no 
matter they really constitute the basis of actions or manipulated by the decision 
makers and stay merely at discursive or symbolic levels. Before analyzing the case 
according to this perspective, I discuss the national security culture of Turkey in the 
next chapter by putting forward the relevant dimensions in relation to Kardak Crisis. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
 THE NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE OF TURKEY 
 
 
3.1  The Main Drivers of Turkish National Security Culture 
Huntington (1996: 138) thinks that Turkey is a torn country “where there is a 
single predominant culture belonging to one civilization, but whose leaders are 
attempting to shift it to another civilization”. Brzezinski (1997: 47) regards Turkey as 
a geopolitical pivot which has significance arising from its “sensitive location” and 
potential vulnerability. Even without an in-depth analysis on the relevance of these 
conceptualizations about Turkey, these interesting interpretations can at least lead us 
to the idea that Turkey is a peculiar country which cannot be categorized easily. This 
in turn has impact on the security culture of Turkey and deserves particular attention 
in analyzing the security policies of the country. 
There has been an increasing concern on the history of Turkey at international 
sphere (Jenkins, 2001: 5; Shaw, 2000: 634). In fact, the writings on Turkish history go 
back to the Byzantine writings and later on to the fifteenth and particularly sixteenth 
centuries. In the US, these studies were intensified in 1940s with particular reference 
to the relation of Ottoman history to the European history in order to understand the 
Western civilization better. Particularly during Cold War years, “the strictly 
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Orientalist approach by which Islam was looked upon as a total culture has been 
supplemented by the new approaches and methods [of] history, political science, 
sociology, anthropology and economics” (Shaw, 2000: 627). It should be kept in mind 
that without “a basic knowledge and understanding … of the country, its language, 
people and culture”, the studies and interpretations of Turkish history would be 
incomplete with “merely a short range interest stimulated by the contemporary 
international scene” (Shaw, 2000: 632-634). Each nation has continuity in its history 
and this rarely presents a complete break from the past (Ahmad, 2002: 11). Though 
risky, we require prediction in international relations. The consistent and slowly 
changing Turkish foreign policy gives us the opportunity to understand particularly 
the security policies (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 346). This is mainly true for Turkey, 
given the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of Republic of Turkey and 
the long history of the Turks. In understanding the security policies of Turkey, we 
need to consider its cultural and historical context (Karaosmanoglu, 2000: 199). The 
psychology of perceptions lying under the motives and decisions of policy makers can 
be traced back to the historical experiences of the country and its people. 
 
3.1.1 Historical experiences as a source of perceptions/as a driver of 
Turkish national security culture 
As Karaosmanoglu (2000: 200-201) argues, in Turkish history, there is “a 
relatively consistent security culture of realpolitik which has evolved across the 
centuries from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one”. 
“Ottoman realpolitik began to acquire a defensive character” in order to preserve the 
status quo through military and diplomatic means. The concept of balance of power 
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became an inevitable part of its diplomatic and strategic policy which was in fact 
inherited by Turkey. The fear of loss of territory and the secret plans of the Europeans 
on the lands of late Ottoman Empire was transferred to the Turkish Republic through 
the Treaty of Sevres which proves the reasons of the Sevres Syndrome. The Treaty of 
Sevres according to which the Ottoman territory was partitioned among the European 
powers, marked the end of the Ottoman Empire following the end of First World War 
(Davutoglu, 2001: 515). 
It is a fact that Turkey inherited the heartland and population of the Ottoman 
Empire which resulted in a transfer of Ottoman legacy to the Republic of Turkey 
either with certain advantages and disadvantages affecting its foreign policy seriously. 
Aydin divides these effects into two as constructive and problematic legacies. The 
constructive legacies include “the established traditions in state governance, 
importance given to territory and its continuity, … carefully articulated foreign and 
security policies, benefiting from the hindsight”. On the other hand, problematic 
legacies included “the bitter memories of neighboring countries, misleading images 
about the country and the people, and remembrance of past misdeeds of foreign 
states”. This gave birth to “a sense of continual harassment and thus a ‘security 
syndrome’ within the country” (Aydin, 2003: 307).  
Moreover, according to Bilgin (2005: 187), the policy-makers in Turkey are 
used to formulate policies by giving reference to the “geographical location to justify 
both ‘Turkey’s unique sensitiveness’ argument and ‘Turkey’s unique opportunities’ 
argument. This has dominated the security discourses since the establishment of the 
Republic (Bilgin, 2005: 187; Sezer, 1992: 19). For this reason, there is a “moderation 
and caution that has traditionally characterized Turkey's approach to international and 
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regional affairs” as Sayari (2000: 169) argues. This arises from Sevres-phobia which 
can be defined as a syndrome that the “external world and their internal collaborators 
are trying to weaken and divide Turkey” (Mufti, 1998: 43). 
It is argued that the leaders of the newly established Republic searched for 
ways of breaking with the Ottoman past as they associated the Ottoman legacy with 
“ignorance, corruption, backwardness and dogmas” (Aydin, 2003: 307). In order to 
establish a totally new state, “they had to clear away the ruins of the Empire, disown 
its legacy and discover new virtues based on the ‘Turkish nation’ ” (Aydin, 2003: 
307-308). With its establishment, Turkey transformed itself into a totally different 
structure. Because, unlike the Ottoman Empire, it was a nation-state “based on the 
preservation of the status quo rather than on expansionist principles; possessing a 
more homogenous society in contrast to the multinational character of the empire.” 
(Aydin, 2003: 308).  
In the late Ottoman Empire the process of westernization started and was 
transferred to the Republic of Turkey by the progressive elite from the Empire. This 
was a great motivation for Turkey’s Western-oriented policies and incorporated 
“liberal and internationalist elements” into foreign and security policies of the 
country. In this sense, both the Turks and the Europeans have influenced each other 
playing a significant role on each other’s policies. The paradox of “being in Europe 
but not of Europe” became a characteristic of Turkish–European relations (Aydin, 
2003: 307-309). On the other hand, according to Heper (1993: 1), 
for many Westerners, the stereotype of ‘the terrible Turk’ never lost its 
salience. This ambiguous attitude towards the Turks was perhaps best 
expressed when in the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was 
referred to as ‘the sick man of Europe’ – ‘of Europe’ but ‘sick’. 
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The differences in religious, cultural and socio-political systems as well as the 
statecraft made the two worlds of Europe and the Ottomans separated from each other 
which do not seem to have disappeared completely. This still poses challenges to 
Turkey’s relations with the Europeans (Karaosmanoglu, 1991: 159). The Europeans 
think that as “the Turks do not share European culture”, they cannot integrate into 
Europe (Heper, 1993: 4). The different security cultures of Turkey and European 
Union result from diverse paths of thinking upon and practicing security in history. In 
fact, these differences have become more apparent with the end of the Cold War 
(Bilgin, 2004: 26). Today, although the Europeans are reluctant to regard the Turks as 
a part of Europe, it is without doubt that the Ottoman legacy has left Europeans a 
prejudiced image of the Turks (Aydin, 2003: 309). This image is regarded by Stanford 
Shaw (2000: 14) as “the ugly, biased view of the Turks which had been developed in 
Christian Europe for centuries”. This view dominates the Western sources of history 
which attempt to study Ottoman and Turkish history.  
 The reason behind the reluctance of those who are skeptic about Turkey’s EU 
membership (Eurosceptics) is rooted in this legacy. They regard the EU reforms as a 
threat to the unity and integrity of the country (Bilgin, 2005: 189). In other words, 
“the West’s influence in Turkey … has always gone through a filtering process” and 
based on “the images of the West held by critical groups in Turkey” (Heper, Oncu and 
Kramer, 1993: vii). The Western orientation in Turkish Foreign Policy is remarkable 
in the sense that it has constituted one of the main tendencies affecting the foreign 
policy behavior of the state. Today, the point is that, Turkey, as a candidate of the EU 
is in a fragile position due to the possible challenges that might be directed towards 
Turkey during the membership negotiations. It seems that Turkey will act without a 
serious divergence from its national security culture in the sense that the ultimate aim 
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of the Republic of Turkey, that is the survival and going beyond the level of 
contemporary civilization with full independence will be dominant as the core of 
foreign policy principles. 
As the Cold War years, the post-Cold War era has brought Turkey further 
challenges such as “the instability and conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East 
and eastern Mediterranean” complicating Turkey’s traditional foreign policy. Rising 
Kurdish nationalism due to rising ethnicity has also made Turkey to be more cautious 
and defensive about the issues of sovereignty (Aydin, 2003: 324; Lesser, 1992: 41). 
Turkey, although increasingly involved in the neighboring regions, its “principal 
strategic, political and economic relations continue to be with the United States and 
Western Europe” (Sayari, 2000). As Fuller (2004: 51-64) argues, Turkey is trying to 
enlarge its strategic targets within the context of EU membership, international 
terrorism and Middle East problems. In fact, whatever the priorities and the policies 
of Turkey, “be it EU membership, leadership in Eurasia, or strategic partnership with 
the US”, Turkey is forced to make a choice between becoming a “ ‘stable’ regional or 
pivotal power willing to project power beyond its borders” with the traditional 
“military and security considerations” and becoming an “ordinary, but ‘democratic’ 
and self-sufficient state” with “necessary economic and political reforms and 
restructuring and transformation of its system” (Bagci and Kardas, 2004: 454-455). 
This choice poses a difficult task on Turkey which once again proves the ever lasting 
challenges on Turkey arising from its historical background and geographical 
location. Thus, it can be argued that the strategic thinking should not be 
underestimated in the foreign policy making of Turkey, as it was not underestimated 
in the military tactics during history. The geopolitics and the dynamics of the region 
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put pressure on Turkey to adjust itself to the changing conditions which is possible 
through the existence of multiple strategies and tools. 
For the coming years, it remains to be seen whether Turkey will be flexible 
enough to succeed in adjusting itself to the international circumstances and moving 
further towards strengthening itself through using the advantages of the characteristics 
of its foreign policy in line with its national security culture in order to overcome the 
posed challenges and threats. Indeed, the success of Turkey is likely to depend on the 
pursuit of pro-active policies with a strategic thinking and a sense of self confidence 
rather than following reactive policies which may decrease the policy choices and 
flexibility to respond to the various challenges arising from international 
circumstances. 
 
3.1.2 National identity as a driver of Turkish national security culture  
National identity is another important aspect of Turkish national security 
culture. During the Turkish War of Independence, “the Turks learned from their 
enemies … how to use nationalism as a constructive device to achieve national ends” 
(Shaw, 2000: 450). “Turkish nationalism” emerged as a unifying factor by preventing 
“the class struggles and ideological divisiveness”. It “encouraged the Turks to rebuild 
their own land, without fostering aggressive irredentist aspirations”. Because it was 
“not imperialistic; it did not seek to achieve greatness by regaining lands once ruled 
by the Ottomans, even in the case of areas still inhabited by considerable Turkish 
minorities”. The Turks preferred to establish “a modern state for the Turks within the 
boundaries of the Republic created by the Treaty of Lausanne”. The only purpose 
concerning “the lost territories, was to make sure the Turks living in them were 
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treated fairly and justly”. The policy towards the neighbors rested on “cooperation for 
mutual benefit” (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 376). Today, Turkish nationalism is still 
regarded as the very basis of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, which 
seems to continue as an inevitable factor of the survival of the state, however not 
necessarily in extreme and destructive terms, but rather in constructive terms 
providing integrity. This is mostly due to the nature of nationalism defined by 
Ataturk. The Republic of Turkey was established upon the principle of nationalism 
which rejects xenophobia and relies on the basis of citizenship. The national character 
was shaped within this framework. The nation, sharing a common past, also 
determined the characteristics of the relations with the other nations. 
This understanding of national identity determines the choice of the country in 
the international system. Within the context of the historical experiences, Turkish 
people are sensitive about their national identities and consider it as a part of integrity 
of the country. At the same time, they did not rely on imperialistic aspirations, but 
rather focused on status-quo, international peace and cooperation. 
 
3.1.2.1 The role of NATO membership 
In contrast to what Ataturk had determined as one of the priorities of the 
Republic of Turkey, the “complete independence” principle had to be left after World 
War II within the context of international politics. As Bagci (2001: 129) argues, this 
was a sign of a new trend in Turkish Foreign Policy. During the Cold War, Turkey, by 
burdening the “key role” that is given to her in the Near East, Americanized its 
foreign policy.  The Turkish Government searched for a formal alliance, and a link 
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with the Western defense system which was made possible with Turkey’s accession to 
NATO on February 18, 1952.  
Close Turkish-American relations started after World War II due to the Soviet 
threat directed towards Turkey. On March 12, 1947, the American support to Turkey 
started with the Truman Doctrine which envisaged giving support to Turkey and 
Greece in order to prevent Soviet expansionism. From that time onwards, the main 
target for Turkey has been to become a member of all political, military and economic 
organizations which had been established in the leadership of the West. Turkey 
regarded this doctrine as a tight common policy. This was the sign of Western 
orientation in Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the NATO membership of Turkey 
proved the determinacy of Turkey for being a Western ally which was in fact one of 
the turning points in Turkish history. The Turkish-American interests converged 
within the context of Eisenhower Doctrine of the United States which aimed at 
preventing the Soviet influence and filling the power vacuum in the Middle East 
where the British influence gradually decreased (Bagci, 2001: 3-8, 35, 84-92).  
NATO has been a pillar in Turkish security policy and it served at 
psychological level through which Turkey perceived the world and its relations with 
external actors (Sezer, 1989: 52). The NATO membership of Turkey “contributed to 
bridging the psychological gap with the West”, if not totally removed the lack of trust 
towards the West. All in all, “NATO is very useful for Turkey’s security, and it 
constitutes a valuable tie with the West” (Karaosmanoglu, 1993: 31). From the 1990s 
onwards, Turkey attempted to further internalize the identity of the Alliance in order 
to deal with the post-Cold War challenges (Oguzlu, 2004a: 471). Thus, it can be 
argued that as long as the long term interests of Turkey and the United States 
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continue, despite the natural divergent policy priorities in defining the threat 
perceptions from time to time (Okman, 2004: 24), their close relations and the 
alliance will continue. 
NATO membership has a role of introducing new elements to the security 
culture of Turkey such as the crisis-management habits and tactics. After the Cold 
War, NATO has transformed itself in many respects including “its involvement in 
ending conflict, restoring peace and building stability in crisis regions” (NATO, 
2005:1).2 While the new tactics mainly focus on the crisis management tactics in 
possible conflicts on different locations of the world, “far from Alliance territory” 
(NATO, 2005:6), the Alliance has also developed techniques for providing peace and 
stability among its members. As stated in NATO Review (NATO, 2006: 13), the 
position of NATO in a possible conflict between the member states was determined as 
in the following: 
“Any dispute between member countries which has not proved capable 
of direct settlement should be submitted to good offices procedures 
within the NATO framework, before resorting to any other 
international agency (except for disputes of a legal or an economic 
character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially 
in the appropriate specialized organizations). The Secretary General 
should be empowered to offer his good offices to the countries in 
dispute and, with their consent, to initiate or facilitate procedures of 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.” 
 
 
Turkey has been very active in NATO initiatives. Particularly, after the end of 
Cold War, it has contributed greatly to the peace building efforts of the alliance 
through various means. Within this context, through courses and seminars for NATO 
countries, it has been supporting the “Partnership for Peace” program which is 
                                                 
2 For information about NATO’s strategic concept approved on 23-24 April 1999 in relation to 
“Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”, see NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm; Aybet, Gulnur, June 1999. “NATO’s Developing 
Role in Collective Security: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”. SAM Papers No. 4/99: 91. 
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launched by the Alliance for “forging practical security links between the Alliance 
and its Partners” (Aybet, 1999:91) and for the purpose of maintaining good relations 
among the states in Eurasia (Turkish Armed Forces, 2007): 
 
In the light of the decisions taken "In the January 1994 NATO 
Summit" in Brussels, Turkey decided to establish a "PfP Training 
Center", and declared the establishment of PfP Training Center at the 
EAPC (Euro Atlantic Partnership Council) meeting in Sintra / Portugal 
on 30 May 1997. 
 
Therefore, NATO membership is an important stage in the evolution of 
Turkish identity and the national security culture. NATO as a representative of 
Western identity helped Turkey to define itself as Western in the international system. 
Moreover, becoming a member of a security community served as a deterrent against 
fighting with another member of that community. This has a special significance 
when it comes to crisis situations, complicating the strategies and decisions of that 
country. In other words, this choice of Turkey has restricted its behavior and moves as 
it has to keep a balance between the different elements of its national security culture. 
 
3.1.2.2  The role of military in national security culture of Turkey  
The military is one of the state institutions which undertake the responsibility 
of preserving and transferring the basic characteristics of Turkish national security 
culture. Its role in national security culture is considered within this framework. The 
Turkish foreign policy tradition attaches the military force a deterrent character, 
which is in line with the aim of preservation of the status quo. Besides, in order to 
provide security beyond the borders and to preserve peace and security of the country 
within the international system the military undertakes the mission of providing 
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expertise and knowledge on key security issues. In Turkey, military is the institution 
which perceives threats and comprehends the historical experiences well and which 
has technical and practical expertise, particularly within NATO context as NATO is 
mostly well-known by military personnel compared to the other institutions. 
In the shaping of Turkish culture and societal structure, military has had a 
significant role. The Turkish armed forces take its heritage from the Ottoman army 
which was “the vanguard of reform and Westernization” in the Empire 
(Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 313). The establishment of modern Republic of Turkey was 
possible after driving out the occupying forces and the Greek army with the War of 
Independence led by Ataturk following World War I (Jenkins, 2001: 10). This implies 
that in Turkish history the military constitutes the basis of the state and its survival. 
The understanding of national security is shaped accordingly.  
The post-Cold War context seems to have created a different security 
understanding for Turkey. A “broadening of Turkey’s security agenda” and “the 
convergence of foreign and security policies since the 1990s” can be regarded as the 
response of Turkey to “the challenge of globalised security” (Bilgin, 2005). The role 
of the military in external security issues should be considered within this context. 
Despite the challenges of globalization, the core principles inherent in the national 
security culture of Turkey continue to be incorporated into the decision making 
process and serve as guidelines particularly during crisis management. This is realized 
both through the efforts of the military and the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) which embodies the foreign policy culture of Turkey. 
In Turkey, the role of national security culture on foreign policy and 
particularly in crisis management can be observed in the meetings, reports and 
 43
declarations of NSC. Here, it should be noted that rather than examining the 
mechanical process of decision making or formal procedures, observing the priority 
and sensitivity attached to the national security culture deserves particular attention. 
These priorities and sensitivity is inherent firstly among the large segments of the 
society in the form of public opinion, which influences the decision makers; secondly 
and more importantly reflected and raised in NSC meetings. 
In Turkey, the main institutions of foreign policy and decision making have 
been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces 
(Tayfur and Goymen, 2002: 101). The Turkish military plays a role through “formal 
and informal mechanisms, both utilizing official platforms, such as participation in 
the NSC, and setting policy parameters through public and private expressions of 
opinion”. The latter is particularly influential on policy making. The policy objectives 
of the military are described within the “National Security Policy Document 
(NSPD)”. This document is updated and prepared by “the TGS, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the National Intelligence Organization (NIO) under the 
coordination of the NSC General Secretariat” in approximately every five-year 
period. However, the military does not intervene in the legislation process. For this 
reason, it influences the policy and decision making through “guidelines in order to 
ensure either that government policy remains within specific parameters or that the 
government takes measures to address specific threats”. The recommended policies 
may or may not be immediately implemented by the civilian government. The 
governments usually do not contradict with what military recommends in terms of 
external security policies. More importantly, whenever the issues are “urgent or 
critical, such as a perceived imminent threat”, the military puts increasing pressure 
upon the government to act (Jenkins: 2001: 41-42, 47, Ozcan, 1998: 77-80). 
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The role of General Secretariat of NSC has increased with legal regulations. 
On 9 January 1997, the code of Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center3 entered 
into force. According to the code, the NSC is the competent body in the management 
of crises. The threat perceptions and the measures to be taken are decided by the 
Council (Ozcan, 1998: 75-76, 96). 
The Defense White Paper 20004, prepared by Turkish Ministry of National 
Defense aims at: 
“… providing the public in Turkey and abroad with a better 
understanding and clarity of the basic information on the National 
Defense Policies and the Turkish Armed Forces constituted by secular 
and democratic Turkey, which places the highest priority on 
deterrence for the establishment and maintenance of peace in the 
region, that is a critical region from all aspects”. 
 
 The document explains the priorities of Turkey and how these priorities 
determine the national security policies of the country. The views of NSC are given 
utmost importance in the formulation of these policies. It is emphasized that the 
Council undertakes its responsibilities within the framework of the laws and 
regulations provided. Particularly in crisis times, the NSC operates quite effectively. 
For this reason, from time to time it is regarded as the most supreme body within the 
country. (Karaoz, 2003: ix, 68).  
The influence of the military in shaping the foreign and security policy of 
Turkey has increased in the late 1990s.5 Particularly in security matters, the threat 
                                                 
3 The code was published in the official gazette, on 9 January 1997, No.22872. For the full text of the 
code, see http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/20240.html . 
4 For the full text, see http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GNPP/html/pdf/PREF.pdf . 
5 It should also be noted that as it is mostly mentioned by media and some analysts, during the periods 
of Ozal in the 1980s (Cowell, 1987) and AKP government since early 2000s (Taspinar, 2004), the role 
of military is challenged. For instance, the advices of the military on the last Annan Plan concerning 
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perceptions concerning the Middle East countries and Greece, the policies have been 
determined in accordance with the opinions of military elites (Kut, 1998: 59, Ozcan, 
1998: 81). The degree of public support, the cooperation with the civilians and the 
degree of vitality of the issue determine the extent of influence of the military on 
security and defense policy making. In general, it would not be wrong to argue that 
concerning the external key security issues, the civilians rarely oppose the 
recommendations of the military.  
 
3.2 The Explanatory power of culture in Turkish Foreign and Security 
Policy 
The characteristics of Turkish national security culture observed in an analysis 
of historical experiences can be traced in the foreign policy culture of the country. 
Moreover, these characteristics are reflected in the foreign and security policies of the 
state. In Turkey, status-quo and Westernization are among the characteristics inherent 
in the national security culture shaping the foreign and security policies.  
According to Davutoglu (2001: 17), culture is among the constant 
determinants of foreign policy. Although Oran (2001: 46-53) argues that it is difficult 
to reduce the foreign policy of a state having more than eighty years history to a few 
principles or to find a continuous and consistent factor, he puts forward two main 
principles of Turkish Foreign Policy as being a state searching for the preservation of 
                                                                                                                                            
Cyprus were not taken into consideration. Moreover, AKP government has not paid attention to the 
recommendations of the military on EU policies in relation to Turkey’s security interests. These trends 
lead to certain discussions of whether Turkey’s security interests are undermined or not. The doubts 
whether these policies create a security gap, result from the fact that they may underestimate the 
elements of Turkey’s national security culture. Since the case of this thesis takes place in other than 
these periods and the debate would involve a domestic political context, it falls beyond the scope of 
this study. Thus, it is assumed that the military has an influential role in decisions about international 
security issues as a general tendency of Turkish national security culture. 
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status quo and westernism. Rosenau (1971: 19-20) states that “the land, its fertility 
and climate, and its location … all contribute both to the psychological environment 
through which officials and publics define their links to the external world”. 
As Hale (2000: 7) argues, the geographical situation, human and natural 
resources and the economic development of Turkey affect its international position. 
The defensive character inherent in the security culture of Turkey is stated by Aydın 
(2003: 310-311) as such: Turks “learned, as a result of centuries-long hostilities with 
their neighbors, not to trust any state, to rely on nothing but their power, and to be 
ready to fight at any given time.” This is also reflected in “Turkish sayings” such as 
“‘water sleeps, the enemy never sleeps’ and ‘prepare for war, if you want peace’”. For 
this reason, “the Turkish diplomatic apparatus is known today, among other things, 
for being skeptical and cautious to the extreme.” For instance, the “Turkish sensitivity 
about Greek efforts to internationalize Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul or any 
possibility of accepting Armenian genocide claims” should be considered within this 
context (Aydın, 2003: 311-312). In the post Cold War period, in Turkey, there is a 
feeling of being lonely in international relations with the newly emerging threats and 
increasing problems on the issues such as cross border terrorism, ethnic conflicts, 
immigration, Kurdish separatism, disputes with Greece, Cyprus problem and the 
water dispute in the Middle East (Bagci and Bal, 2004: 105). It seems that Turkey will 
continue to face threats which create security problems (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 347). 
This picture reflects the inherent elements of national security culture of Turkey and 
reflected in the foreign policy orientation of the state. 
 Turkey, “from a purely military perspective” can be regarded as “the strongest 
regional power” (Alp and Turkes, 2001: 142). The principle of “Peace at home, peace 
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abroad” was formulated by Ataturk and it constitutes “the cornerstone of Turkey’s 
conduct in external relations”. It implies preserving the status quo in terms of the 
unity and integrity of the state and the “clear Turkish identity” in “a relatively 
homogenous national state”. Signing significant treaties and non-aggression pacts 
with neighbors was an example of the search for peace and status quo in its region. 
Nevertheless, this had to be managed “in a Machiavellian world of power politics”, 
avoiding “any illusion about the nature of the international system” as stated by 
Karaosmanoglu (2000: 208; 1993: 30).  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
 THE CASE OF KARDAK CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
Kardak Crisis occurred in 1996 which corresponds to a time when Turkey, as 
most of the states was trying to adapt itself into the changing conditions of the post-
Cold War period. 
 
4.1 The Aegean Disputes 
 Greece and Turkey periodically experience crises which shape their bilateral 
relations. Despite the existence of crises there is a status-quo based continuity in the 
relationship. The people of both countries pass through a process carrying the 
inheritance of past experiences. This leads to an aggregate behavior of the states 
towards each other rather than rational or conscious acts. Despite the existence of 
crises over a number of disputes, there has been no war between the two (Guner, 
2004: 297).  The relations between Turkey and Greece are examined to the extent that 
it constitutes the basis of the perceptions and approaches of the two countries towards 
each other. It will contribute to understanding the Turkish side’s priorities, reactions, 
and responses in managing Kardak crisis. 
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Gunduz (2001: 81) outlines the disputes between Turkey and Greece mainly in 
three groups: 
• Aegean disputes, which in turn may be further divided into six 
closely related categories: a) the dispute over the boundaries of 
territorial waters; b) the dispute over the delimitation of the 
continental shelf; c) the dispute over the extent of Greek airspace; 
d) the dispute over the demilitarized status of some Greek islands 
in the close vicinity of Turkish coasts; e) the dispute over the 
flight information region (FIR) line; and f) the dispute over the 
ownership of those geographical formations, islets, or rocks that 
according to Turkey were not ceded to Greece by international 
treaties 
• The Cyprus conflict 
• Minority issues. 
Also of concern are command-and-control issues in the Aegean 
within the framework of NATO.  
 
For Kramer (1991: 61), “Turkey reacts like any state” and “tries to get as 
much as possible … by declaring these issues to be cases of national interest”. This is 
“the collective psychological map of Turkey on which a compromise is very difficult” 
as Turkey associates it with defeat. The solutions in these issues should 
simultaneously bring material satisfaction and be “free from any inclination [of] 
sacrifices with respect to the integrity of the Turkish nation and its territory”. The 
politico-psychological background in Turkish-Greek relations and the high sensitivity 
about national integrity and sovereignty of both countries explain why some 
seemingly technical problems are very difficult to deal with.  
 
 4.1.1 The dispute over the ownership of islets and rocks   
Turkish side attributes the Aegean Sea a sui generis character. With many 
scattered islands and islets, it is a semi-closed sea. For this reason, Turkey claims that 
“1958 and 1982 Conventions on the Law of the Sea cannot be applied here”. This 
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approach is contrary to the arguments of the Greeks who claim that “all the islands 
with the Greek mainland have their own continental shelves”. In the case of 
application of those conventions in line with the Greek arguments, Greeks would have 
serious gains (Oguzlu, 1998: 33-34, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 339-341) and the Aegean 
Sea would turn out to be a Greek Sea. 
Inan and Baseren (1997: 1) explains the legal aspect of Kardak crisis in Status 
of Kardak Rocks. They argue that Greece does not base its claims on geographical, 
historical and legal facts. The boundary and the name of Limnia/Imia on some of the 
maps that Greece relies on are “not envisaged in international treaties”. 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 is the basic document determining the boundaries of 
Turkey including the status of islands in the Aegean. In this Treaty, the islands ceded 
to Italy are also mentioned. According to Greece’s claims, the 1932 Ankara 
Convention determines the status of the Rocks together with a number of islands, 
islets and rocks in the Aegean. However, the treaty signed between Turkey and Italy 
only solved sovereignty disputes over Castellorizo Region. The additional meetings 
and prepared documents of Italian and Turkish technicians on the status of 
Dodecanese islands did not gain legality and ratified by the parties. For this reason, it 
did not enter into force. After the World War II, these islands under Italian 
sovereignty including those in the Dodecanese Region were ceded to Greece by Paris 
Treaty of 1947. Contrary to Greek claims, Turkey argues that those islands, islets and 
rocks including Kardak were not ceded to Italy with the Proces Verbal of 1932 which 
did not enter into force and therefore stayed within Turkish territorial waters.6 For 
                                                 
6 For details about legal claims of Turkey and Greece, the relevant articles of international treaties and 
documents, see Inan, Yuksel and Sertac H. Baseren. 1997. Status of Kardak Rocks. Ankara: n.p. (ISBN 
975-96281-0-4), 4-16; and also Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, “Aegean Disputes”, available at 
http://www.turkishembassy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=225&Itemid=240 . 
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Turkey, Greece cannot legally prove that it has sovereignty over Kardak Rocks as 
Turkey did not cede these rocks to Greece according to the international treaties. The 
unilateral attempts of Greece do not have an international binding effect. This is only 
“a symptom of expansionist desires of Greece” (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2-9). 
 
4.1.2 Military balance in the Aegean  
The balance between Turkey and Greece was made with the Lausanne Treaty. 
This balance regulated the bilateral relations until the two states attempted to change 
the status-quo.  Oguzlu (1998: 70-71) points out these attempts:  
The Greek attempts to militarize the Eastern Aegean islands off the 
Turkish coast, Greece’s attempt extending its territorial waters 
beyond the existing six miles, turning the Aegean Sea into a Greek 
lake, and the unification of Cyprus with mainland Greece were 
perceived by Turkey as a calculated attempt by Athens at changing 
the Lausanne balance. On the other hand, the Greek governments 
have been accusing Turkey of altering the status quo both in the 
Aegean and in Cyprus. The de facto partition of Cyprus in the 
aftermath of the 1974 military operation has been referred to by 
Greece as evidence to prove their arguments. 
 
In Greece, Turkey is regarded as “a revisionist state, seeking to change or even 
to thwart the status quo in its favor”. Greece, on the other hand is presented as “a 
status quo state”, willing to preserve “what it possesses in law”. According to the 
perspective of Turkey, the situation is the opposite of Greek perceptions that Greece 
“unilaterally defines and declares its own ‘rights’ in the Aegean and … creates its own 
de facto status quo”. Greece’s refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations explains this 
attitude. This is against international law in the sense that the boundary and 
sovereignty disputes need to be solved bilaterally, not unilaterally. The Greek attitude 
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constitutes a potential for further tensions and an obstacle to peaceful relations 
(Gunguz, 2001: 87, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 339). 
 Whereas for Greeks, the Aegean Sea exclusively belongs to them, Turkey does 
not have such an attitude. According to the arguments of Turkey, “Ankara seems to 
share certain deposits under the seabed and wants to have unhindered navigational 
access to its military and maritime ships”. For this reason the question of sovereignty 
is at the center of debates concerning Aegean Sea. They always constitute a source for 
possible tensions. Turkey wants to solve each of these disputes separately by dealing 
with on its own merits rather than linking the issues with other disputed areas such as 
Cyprus (Oguzlu, 1998: 31, 87-88). 
For Turkey, “the international legal base of the republic” is “another 
[sensitive] motive of Turkish foreign policy”. The outsiders have difficulty in 
understanding this legal stand point. Because, even in cases where there is no concrete 
limitation for Turkey’s international position or activities, Turkey applies this 
approach. An example is the attitude of Turkey in “the remilitarization of the Greek 
islands in the eastern Aegean” even under NATO, and despite the advantageous 
position of Turkey in terms of the overall military balance between Turkey and 
Greece.7 It seems that Turkey wants to prevent other states to demand revisions in 
relation to their positions determined by Lausanne. (Kramer, 1991: 61-62). 
 
 
                                                 
7 For a comparison of “Conventional Armed Forces” between Turkey and Greece in 1997, see the 
statistics provided by International Institute for Strategic Studies. 1997. The Military Balance, 
1997/1998. London: Oxford University Press, available at 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP29appendix.htm . 
 53
4.1.3 The balance of interests between peace and war 
4.1.3.1 The historical experiences as a source of perceptions  
 In understanding the foreign policy of a country, it is difficult to have an 
opinion about the interests and motivations of that country. This mainly results from 
the ambiguous meanings of the concepts due to the lack of a certain definition which 
is commonly accepted. When it is assumed that the motives refer to the “basic factors 
which guide foreign policy behavior” and the interests referring to the goals, this 
implies that the analysis focuses on non-material factors. Such an outlook, despite the 
difficulty in dealing with these concepts, can contribute to the better comprehension 
of the roots of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Greece. In this sense, objective factors 
such as geography, economy or military considerations are not merely enough in 
exploring the non-materialistic aspect of the issues. According to Kramer, this 
background is shaped by “the common history of both countries and the imprints that 
this history has left on the collective psychological map of both publics”. This 
common heritage of “traumatic historical experiences” can explain the perceptions 
and behaviors of each side. The determinants of Turkey’s attitude towards Greece can 
also be observed in the general motivations of Turkish foreign policy (Kramer, 1991: 
57-59).  
Turkey and Greece tend to base their arguments on legal grounds. However, 
the underlying source of the disputes are basically “nationalistic perceptions and 
historically defined attitudes” (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 339). The two states could not 
coexist peacefully due to the root causes of problems, particularly the psychological 
barriers. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the past experiences of the two 
sides. However, we should keep in mind that there have been many distortions of 
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history provoking both sides against each other, legitimizing certain arguments and 
increasing the conflicts (Oguzlu, 1998: 2, 5). Therefore, anyone who wants to 
comprehend the dynamics of the relations would require a well-done analysis. 
  The problems between Turkey and Greece have such a characteristic that they 
are transferred from one generation to another. At the basis of their images of each 
other and threat perceptions are shaped by cognitive processes which have influenced 
the feelings and behaviors of the two sides (Ayman, 1998: 291-292, 293). The 
national thinking in two states has been influenced with a cultural mistrust dating 
back to history (Oguzlu, 2004b: 98). The relations between the two states have often 
been shaped by mutual distrust and deterrence rather than by mutual trust and 
cooperation efforts. Kramer (1991: 58) summarizes the underlying nature of the 
attitudes of Greece and Turkey towards each other as such: 
Modern Greece establishes her national identity to a large extent on the 
successful struggle against the Ottoman yoke, which in the Turkish view 
is identical with the acceleration of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. 
On the other hand, the Republic of Turkey owes her existence, inter alia, 
to a successful ‘war of independence’ in which Greek occupational troops 
in western and central Anatolia were the main enemy. What is for the 
Turks the birth of their state is for the Greeks the definite end of some 
type of neo-imperialistic ideology. 
 
Concerning the Greek perceptions, Oguzlu (1998: 2) points out the origins of 
Greek attitude: 
The Greek nation could get its independence mainly through the help of 
outside powers and this fact later enabled these countries to shape this 
newly borne Greek nation according to their ideals. In this respect, the 
impositions of “Hellenism” on the Greek nation necessitated the portrayal 
of the Turks as their enemy par excellence. This in turn determined in the 
next decades, especially after the W.W.II [World War II], the main 
patterns of Greek behavior towards Turkey. 
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With the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans, the Orthodox Greeks started to 
live under Ottoman domination. In 19th century, the Empire started to experience 
difficult times with the revolts of different nations under its domination. The first of 
these influenced from French Revolution ideas was the Greek community. After the 
independence of the Serbs in 1814, the Greeks obtained their independence in 1830 
with the support of European powers. These supports continued in the following 
centuries. The continuous foreign support in Greek foreign policy since its 
independence led to the fact that “the Greeks could not face the Turks on their own”. 
Moreover, their territories extended at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, including 
many Aegean islands following 1913 Balkan Wars (Oguzlu, 1998: 6-11, 
Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 292; Ayman, 1998: 299, 309). 
With the end of World War I, the Greek troops attempted to impose the Sevres 
Treaty in Anatolian territories (Oguzlu, 1998: 11). In 1919, when Greek forces 
invaded Izmir, they massacred thousands of Turks. The Muslims in the Aegean region 
of Anatolia were “killed or deported and replaced … with Greek settlers who were 
said to be ‘returning’ to their homes, to provide demographic justification for their 
ambition to annex the area to imperial Greece” (Shaw, 2000: 418, 447). The Turkish 
War of Independence started upon this experience of invasion, particularly of the 
Greece’s (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 357; Sezer, 1992: 18).  
With the improvement of bilateral relations (Oguzlu, 1998: 11), in 1930, Greece 
and Turkey signed a treaty of friendship which set the boundaries and resolved the 
problems of population exchange. They also agreed on “naval equality in the Eastern 
Mediterranean” and confirmed the status quo (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 376). Until 
1950s, the two countries were strategic allies. The historians think that this period 
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proves the possibility of a peaceful coexistence for Turkey and Greece. In fact, the 
improvement of relations resulted from the deteriorated capabilities and domestic 
problems of Greece, the status quo orientation of the two states following the World 
War I, and the absence of Cyprus and Aegean disputes triggered by the support of 
foreign powers (Oguzlu, 1998: 11-13).  
Unfortunately, the politicians of the both sides have used the existing perceptions 
of the two sides for weakening their political rivals and increasing their domestic 
popularity. Because, such policies seem attractive in order to win the elections 
(Oguzlu, 1998: 21). In contrast to such a situation at state level, at the personal level, 
the Turks do not feel direct hostility against Greek people that “the image of the other 
side as the ‘arch enemy’ is more a collective image” rather than an individual one. 
Furthermore, this image among the public opinion is shaped by an “indifference rather 
than as emotional interest” (Kramer, 1991: 59; Ayman, 1998: 305-306). As it is argued 
in the descriptive explanation of the case, the discourses of political leaders in Kardak 
crisis and the attitude of Turkish media are examples to the use of inherent sentiments 
in the national security culture for political or material considerations. In fact, the 
historical background and the perceptions influence the policy making and actions of 
the state, not directly the individual conduct of relations.  
The Western factor played a significant role in the misperceptions of the both 
sides. The Greeks, in order to emerge as a nation had to adapt an anti-Turkish stance 
by labeling the Turks as barbar and uncivilized. It is noteworthy that Hellenism 
embodied anti-Turkish attitudes and it was formulated in Western European capitals 
through idealization of Greek civilization as the source of western civilization. 
Similarly, the Turks constructed their anti-Greek attitude through a Western 
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perspective and regarded Greece as the naughty boy of the West. It seems that the West 
is close to Greeks in civilizational and cultural terms, while willing to keep Turkey as 
a strategic and economic ally. Such a Western approach influences the perceptions of 
the two actors in a negative way both in terms of bilateral relations and the 
international security (Oguzlu, 1998: 17-18; Ayman, 1998: 305).  
The Greek myth of Megali Idea is based on “the hope that Greece would one day 
re-take all the territories that it or its antecedents lost to Turkey hundreds of years 
ago”. This is regarded by many Turks as the hidden agenda of Greeks who try to 
implement this since its independence in 1830 through expansion of territories at the 
expense of Turkey. This perception constitutes the basis of Turkish fears of a possible 
institutionalization of Greek hostility toward Turkey (Gunduz, 2001: 83). Similarly, 
declaration of Turkey that “it would consider any extension of the Greek territorial sea 
a casus belli8” (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 92; Ayman, 1998: 285) creates a fear on 
the Greek side. 
The threat perceptions of the two sides are shaped by historical experiences, 
beliefs and approaches. In this sense, the current relations are also shaped by the 
learned behaviors and any development is processed through cognitive consistency 
confirming the existing images (Ayman, 1998: 312, 318). It seems that the reaction of 
the two sides to the fears or actions created by the other party result in some of the 
disputes. In this sense firstly the real causes of the problems should be removed 
(Gunduz, 2001: 99) in order to create mutual confidence. Nevertheless, the inherent 
misperceptions are difficult to overcome. 
 
                                                 
8 Casus belli is an event or act which precipitates or is used to justify resort to war” (Berridge and 
James, 2001: 30). 
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4.1.3.2 The role of NATO membership in Turkish-Greek relations  
Turkey, having a mixed policy of deterrence and negotiation towards Greece, 
attaches importance to NATO membership. As both countries are members of NATO, 
the role of this institution has a particular significance in understanding the relations 
between Turkey and Greece. NATO prevents the escalation of the crises between the 
two states. 
During World War II, the good relations continued. After the war, the US 
strategic objectives required to give priority to Greece and Turkey under 1947 
Truman Doctrine and 1948 Marshall Plan (Oguzlu, 1998: 14, 56). With the 
emergence of the Cold War, as a result of the common threat perception, the Soviet 
Union and its allies, Turkey and Greece entered into close political cooperation and 
became members of NATO in 1952. In the absence of such common threat 
perceptions, which has become more apparent with the end of the Cold War, the two 
countries seem to enter into a different atmosphere (Clogg, 1991: 13, 22), still 
carrying the impact of past experiences and the unclear ongoing disagreements on a 
number of issues.  
Even after becoming NATO members, Turkey paid special attention to a 
possible discrimination in favor of Greece. Because, unlike Turkey, they regarded 
Greece as “a natural part of the West and of Europe”. It seems that Turkey has feared 
from possible Greek attempts of isolating Turkey from the West through the Aegean 
disputes and making the Aegean a Greek Sea. According to this view, “As the Aegean 
is a European sea, any country that can claim to be an Aegean country is a European 
country as well” (Kramer, 1991: 65-66). 
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Turkey has special geopolitical importance for the interests of Western 
security. The location of Turkey both creates security for Turkey, and contributes to 
Western security (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 287-289). NATO, EU and the US constitute 
the basic “institutional frameworks of Turkey’s affiliation to the West”. At the same 
time, they have been the other international actors, influencing Turkish-Greek 
relations in a subtle way. Nevertheless, they have not been very successful in solving 
the disputes between the two states in contrary to the expectations (Kramer, 1991: 65; 
Oguzlu, 1998: iv), despite the fact that any tension between Turkey and Greece has 
negative impact on the harmony of NATO (Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 338, Farington, 
1989: 199). The two states could not manage to establish a regional security 
community within the framework of a collective identity under NATO by converging 
their interests and national identities (Oguzlu, 2004a; 458, 461). 
According to Oguzlu (1998: iv, 1), an interesting process started as the two 
states attempted to integrate themselves with the West. Because, not only the former 
problems intensified, but also new disputes emerged in relation to Cyprus and the 
Aegean Sea. Particularly, the Cyprus dispute greatly furthered the problems in the 
Aegean. This intensification can be traced in the somehow contribution of the third 
parties to the lack of trust and the negative perceptions in two states towards each 
other. Whereas in Turkey, the EU is regarded as pro-Greek; NATO is regarded by the 
Greeks an institution favoring Turkish interests (Oguzlu, 1998: iv, 1).  
The increasing problems from 1950s onwards despite NATO membership of 
Turkey and Greece is related to some extent “the emergence of a suitable environment 
… to voice their old arguments more freely”. Because both sides were assuming that 
“the western alliance would not allow them to fight and endanger their security 
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environment”. The two states even carried the disputes to the brink of disasters in the 
crises concerning the Aegean Sea such as “Kardak/Imia Crisis of 1996” (Oguzlu, 
1998: 20). 
Krebs (1999: 369) summarizes the position of NATO in Turkish-Greek 
disputes as follows: 
First, NATO ensured that Greek and Turkish leaders met regularly. 
When such meetings were necessary to defuse tensions, yet politically 
impossible to arrange bilaterally, NATO usefully supplied a face-
saving forum in which statesmen could move beyond rhetoric. 
Second, the alliance powerfully influenced the rivals indirectly, 
through the regular interaction of Greek and Turkish military officers, 
who gained greater understanding of their respective interests and 
perceptions. Third, their membership in the alliance provided the 
United States with a measure of influence over their behavior. Yet 
only under extraordinary circumstances did the United States 
summon the political will to force the pair to bend, and such moments 
were all too rare to stifle the conflict. However, despite the continual 
armed skirmishes and the virtually continuous war of words, the 
dispute never did erupt into full-fledged war, and for that NATO 
deserves some credit. 
 
4.1.3.3 The position of Turkey in Aegean Dispute as a reflection of its 
national security culture: Balancing interests between peace and war 
 Turkey’s foreign policy towards Greece has focused on deterrence and 
negotiation. While the former has been realized with the existence of a powerful army, 
the latter results from favoring status-quo. In other words, Turkey does not prefer to 
use its military power in order to change the status-quo, but rather for deterrence. This 
can be regarded as a mixed strategy composed of deterring expansionist Greek efforts 
through a powerful military and threat of war on the one hand; and posing bilateral 
negotiations in order to solve the disputes legally and peacefully (Ayman, 1998: 285-
286). This is in line with the foreign policy of Turkey which implies an anti-revisionist 
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status-quo orientation. This involves keeping away from disputes among regional 
forces which might influence Turkey negatively. Consequently, Turkey gives utmost 
importance to cooperation and good relations particularly with its neighbors since the 
establishment of the Republic. The reconciliation with Greece following the War of 
Independence is an example to this policy. Besides, Turkey avoided to use force in 
solving the problems and defending its national interests and preferred to base its 
policies and arguments on diplomatic and legal grounds (Kramer, 1991: 59-60).  
 This line of policy can be observed in Turkey’s attitude towards Greece. 
Kramer (1991: 60, 70) points out the tendencies in Turkish approach to its relations 
with Greece:  
The process of reconciliation started by Ataturk and Venizelos after the 
war of independence was crowned by the Treaty of Friendship and Co-
operation of 1933. And since the mid-1950s when the relationship 
between both countries was again marked more by conflict and tensions 
than by friendship and reconciliation, every Turkish government has 
tried to reach a solution by direct bilateral negotiations and has 
normally abstained from the use of force. And if Turkey sometimes had 
recourse to force, this normally did not go beyond the form of 
demonstrative acts and/or threats and was accompanied by a policy of 
careful crisis management which avoided a large scale military 
confrontation. … On the other hand, the Turkish desire to prevent 
critical situations from developing into a military confrontation can be 
substantiated by the de-escalative behavior with respect to some border 
incidents during which soldiers on both sides were shot. 
 
 Turkey only prefers to use force against what Turkey officially calls “domestic 
‘separatist forces’ that endanger the territorial integrity of the country”. Even towards 
those neighbors who allegedly support terrorist activities, Turkey generally relies on 
diplomatic grounds. Preserving the territorial integrity implies “not yielding an inch of 
what was established and internationally recognized as the Republic of Turkey at 
Lausanne in 1923”. Usually this principle is respected by the neighbors with an 
exception of the issues “that were not dealt with at Lausanne or with respect to which 
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new international developments occur”. The questions of international waters are 
examples to such a situation.  (Kramer: 1991: 61).  
Turkey and Greece have different solutions to the problems. Turkey wants to 
negotiate with Greece bilaterally, while Greece wants to use international courts. 
However, this would only be possible with the consent of the two sides together. 
(Oguzlu, 1998: 34-35, Karaosmanoglu, 1988: 340; Sezer, 1989: 49). 
Kramer argues that for Turkey, the only way for the realization of its interests 
in Aegean Sea is Greece’s will to enter into negotiations. Unilaterally, Turkey can 
only preserve the status-quo, which would be unsatisfactory for both sides. In a 
possible negotiation process, “due to the national consensus about the basic motives 
of Turkish foreign policy”, any Turkish government would be so careful to “respect 
national sensitivities … with respect to the content and course of the dialogue”. A 
deviation from the established national consensus would only be in return for a 
“considerable Greek … offer” (Kramer, 1991: 68).  
It should be noted that “for the Turks, … the principle holds true that to talk 
together in any case is preferable to shooting each other” (Kramer, 1991: 69). A no-
talk policy cannot solve sensitive disputes (Gunduz, 2001: 84). However, given the 
source of existing problems, it seems a long process for the two sides to come to 
terms with a permanent solution (Oguzlu, 1998: 91). 
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4.2 Descriptive Explanation of the Case   
4.2.1 The Chain of Events  
In this section, in order to understand the reaction of Turkey to the crisis, the 
declarations of the leaders following the emergence of the crisis, the main 
developments and the actions of Turkey in managing the crisis are mentioned. These 
are mainly traced from the archives of Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey, 
Directorate General of Press and Information (1996a) as well as the other sources. 
 
25 December 1995 
The sovereignty disputes over Kardak turned out to be crisis after 25 
December 1995 when “A ship named Figen Akad ran aground on Kardak Rocks” 
(Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2). “The captain refused assistance from the competent 
Greek authorities” and asserted that the accident occurred within the area under 
Turkish sovereignty (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429). 
 
28 December 1995 
On 28 December, the ship was rescued to the closest Turkish port with the 
escort of Greek ships (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429). 
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29 December 1995 
On 29 December, “Turkey addressed a brief note verbale to Greece … 
claiming that the Kardak (Imia) Rocks were an integral part of Turkish territory” 
(Raftopoulos, 1997: 429), protesting the rescue of Figen Akad by Greece (Office of 
the Prime Minister, 1996a). 
 
9 January 1996 
On 9 January, the response of Greece with a note verbale rejected Turkish 
claim relying on 1932 Agreements between Turkey and Italy and the 1947 Paris 
Treaty. Greece claimed that Kardak Rocks belonged to Greece according to these 
agreements (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429). 
 
24-25 January 1996 
On 24-25 January, the crisis was discussed intensively among both Turkish 
and Greek media.9 On 25 January, the details of the previously unreported incident” 
was published in Hurriyet, one of the Turkish daily newspapers. On the same day, 
“the mayor of Kalymnos, apparently on his own initiative, planted the Greek flag” on 
Kardak Rocks (Jacobides, 2005: 14). 
 
                                                 
9 For a detailed information on the reflection of the crisis in Turkish media, see Akca, Emel Basturk. 
1999. “Ulusal Söylemin İnşasında Yazılı Basın ve Kardak Krizi Örnek Olayı.” (The Written Press in 
the Construction of National Discourse and the Case of Kardak Crisis). Unpublished Master’s Thesis. 
Ankara: Ankara University, Turkey. 
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27 January 1996 
After “the Greek local authorities placed a Greek flag on the … Rocks”, on 27 
January, Turkish journalists removed it and placed a Turkish one. The scenes of these 
actions were broadcasted on TV in Greece and Turkey (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429; 
Veremis, 2001: 44). 
 
28 January 1996 
On 28 January, when Greek soldiers replaced the flag, “fully equipped Turkish 
coastguard vessels appeared in the area and the Greek regional forces were in a state 
of preparedness in order to deter any action against the Imia Rocks”. On the following 
day, a small Greek commando force landed on the Rocks and Turkey addressed 
another note verbale that “the 1932 Agreements between Italy and Turkey were not in 
force because they had been negotiated in the context of the special political situation 
prevailing in the region before World War II” and the 1947 Paris Treaty did not cover 
Kardak Rocks. Turkey declared its readiness “to enter into negotiations to determine 
the regime of the islets and rocks of the eastern Aegean Sea”, as well as “the maritime 
boundaries between the two countries”. Turkey also demanded the withdrawal of 
Greek forces and all symbols of sovereignty (Raftopoulos, 1997: 429, 431; Veremis, 
2001: 44). Greece insisted that Kardak belonged to Greek territory and “that the 
signed treaties left no legal ambiguities, and hence that there was nothing to discuss”. 
After receiving information about Turkish military moves, “seven Greek commandos 
were dispatched to the island to guard the flag” (Jacobides, 2005: 15). 
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29 January 1996 
The NSC was held under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Tansu Ciller.10 
During the meeting the Kardak issue was evaluated and it was stated that Greece 
cannot claim sovereignty over the Rocks. Ciller stated that they want to solve the 
dispute through diplomatic means and they had initiatives at the level of NATO and 
the United Nations. She emphasized that it was out of question for Turkey to give up 
its sovereignty rights and the Greek flag would be taken off and the Greek soldiers 
would withdraw (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). However, it should be noted 
that prior to the NSC meeting, the Prime Minister Ciller indicated the status of Kardak 
was ambiguous. After the discussion of military and civilian officials in the meeting, 
Kardak Rocks were declared as within Turkish territory (Hickok, 2001: 46). 
 
30 January 1996 
The crisis reached its peak on 30 January 1996 when Turkey sent naval forces 
to the area. Greece, as a response, sent additional fleet to the area (Raftopoulos, 1997: 
427) Greek Foreign Minister stated “that under no circumstances would Greece 
remove its flag from the islet”. The crisis escalated at the diplomatic level. In the 
afternoon, “the entire Greek army had been mobilized, and adult males residing on 
nearby islands begin receiving draft notices”. At the end of the day, there was “huge 
firepower in the region” (Jacobides, 2005: 15). After that, “Greece demanded that 
Turkey immediately cease violating Greek territorial sea and airspace pointing out the 
danger of a military confrontation”. Turkey responded by demanding “the withdrawal 
                                                 
10 The participants of NSC meeting included Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, Foreign Ministry 
Undersecretary Onur Oymen, Deputy-Chief of General Staff Cevik Bir, National Intelligence Agency 
Undersecretary Sonmez Koksal, Navy Commander Adm.Guven Erkaya, and officials of General Staff. 
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of ships, men and flags from the area”. At that point, the US intervened with efforts of 
de-escalating the crisis. The US mediation in the crisis resulted in the establishment of 
“a tripartite consultation process” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427). 
In the evening, the “US Secretary of Defense William Perry telephoned Greek 
Defense Minister … for an evaluation of the situation”. The Greek Minister told “that 
the Turks had provoked the confrontation; but offered to recall Greek ships from the 
area and to have the commandos leave Imia if the Turks would recall their ships - but 
he insisted the Greek flag should remain on the islet”. The answer from the US was 
“that both the US and Turkey sought a de-escalation, but that Turkey would withdraw 
its forces only if the Greek flag was removed”. However, this did not solve the 
problem (Jacobides, 2005: 15). 
At night, US President Clinton telephoned Greek Prime Minister Simitis “to 
inform him that Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller was threatening to attack after 
midnight if the situation was not diffused”. There were also long telephone calls with 
the initiative of  US Secretary of State Warren Christopher between Greek Foreign 
Minister and “the US State Department with Richard Holbrooke assuming the role of 
chief mediator” (Jacobides, 2005: 15). 
According to the Turkish Press Review Released by Office of the Prime 
Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information (1996a), during a night long 
security conference among Turkish Prime Minister Ciller, Foreign Minister Deniz 
Baykal and “senior military and intelligence officers”11, Ciller stated that Kardak 
Rocks are within Turkish territory and that “It is out of question for Turkey to allow 
                                                 
11 Other participants of the meeting were “Navy Commander Adm.Guven Erkaya, Deputy-Chief of 
General Staff Cevik Bir, Security Council Secretary-General Gen. Ilhan Kilic, Chief of the Intelligence 
Service Sonmez Koksal and Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Oymen”. The three-hour long 
meeting was called the “War Council” among the press. 
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others to have designs on its territory this way or another”. She emphasized that 
Turkey preferred to solve the dispute peacefully and to start the negotiations 
immediately. Similarly, Baykal mentioned the importance of a diplomatic solution. 
However he added: “We are prepared for every eventuality”, indirectly confirming the 
reports which alerted the armed forces. The Foreign Minister also stated that the 
claims of Greece were not supported by international treaties. Following the council, 
the cabinet members also gathered in a meeting. In the press conference, the Foreign 
Ministry Spokesman Omer Akbel stated “We have told them both sides should refrain 
from unilateral action that could increase tensions. In this context, we have asked 
Greece to withdraw the Greek troops dispatched to the rocks and remove any sign that 
tries to prove Greek sovereignty”. After addressing the note to Greece, in another 
press conference, Akbel explained details about the legal arguments of Turkey.12 
 
31 January 1996 
During the consultation process in the first hours of 31 January, “Turkey 
landed a small commando force on the small unguarded West Imia” (Raftopoulos, 
1997: 427). “Greece had no commandos there, but its warships were within 400 
meters … Under pressure from Holbrooke, the Greek government considered the 
possibility of removing the flag. Holbrooke set 3:30 a.m. as the deadline for a 
decision” (Jacobides, 2005: 15-16). In the end, with the support of US, and through 
                                                 
12 Akbel explained that according to the Turkish view, 1932 agreements between Turkey and Italy, who 
was the possessor of the islands, were not valid. Because, they were never finalized. He said: “Greeks 
themselves have implicitly acknowledged the vacuum in the issue, as they wanted to take up the matter 
with Turkey in 1950 and 1953”. However, no steps were taken for that although Turkey agreed to 
dialogue. The sole valid agreement on the status of Kardak was the 1947 Paris Treaty, which referred 
to “adjacent islands”. He continued: However, the Kardak Rocks, which are 5.5 miles away from the 
nearest Greek island, are neither adjacent nor are they islets”. Akbel added that Turkey informed the 
US Ambassador Marc Grossman about the issue and would also inform the EU and NATO countries. 
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indirect contacts, Turkey and Greece accepted “an agreement of disentanglement [of] 
no ships, no men, no flags” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427). According to the agreement, 
“both sides agreed that the situation would return to the status quo ante” (Jacobides, 
2005: 16). Eventually, Turkey and Greece “simultaneously withdrew step by step, all 
their forces from the area” (Raftopoulos, 1997: 427). 
As it is mentioned in the reviews of Directorate General of Press and 
Information (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a) during the crisis, the US warned 
the parties “that whoever fired the first shot would be held responsible”. The Aegean 
is ultra-sensitive for both sides. For this reason, neither Turkey nor Greece gave up 
until the crisis escalated to its peak in spite of intensive diplomatic contacts, and 
Turkish offers of negotiations. Among NATO members and the US the events 
attracted great attention. 
According to the press release of monthly meeting of Turkish NSC 
(Secretariat General of the National Security Council, 1996), the members of the 
council discussed the problem concerning the Kardak Rocks, which is under Turkish 
sovereignty. The Council stated that during the events, it observed with great pleasure 
that the determined and supreme attitude of all institutions and organizations of the 
state in defending the sovereignty rights of Turkey as well as the support of the public 
to the national policies resulted in a common sense among the country. This subject 
was evaluated as an integral part of the Aegean problem and all other problems 
concerning the Aegean were discussed. It was emphasized that the problems should 
be handled through peaceful means and that the related parties need to cooperate.   
President Demirel, in his written statement, said that the rapidly escalated 
crisis has been overcome with common sense before it turned out to be a great 
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depression. Prime Minister Ciller mentioned that “the issue was handled with 
determinacy and the results were taken”. Foreign Minister Baykal, in his speech to 
Cumhuriyet stated that they did not inform the US about the decision of sending 
military force to Kardak. He also mentioned that the government was pleasured to 
know that the allies understood our target of agreement with Greece (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1996a). 
 
1 February 1996 
 The crisis over Kardak Rocks ended as both parties had withdrawn from the 
region in the early hours of the morning, as the press informs. However, the status of 
Kardak Rocks as well as that of some other islets within the region is left for 
diplomatic negotiation. Turkey considers the withdrawal of Greece “as a climb down 
by the Greeks” and “a victory for Turkey”. President Clinton had stated that he was 
glad that the crisis ended through diplomatic means rather than military means. After 
the crisis ended, the declarations of Turkish leaders were mentioned among the press: 
President Suleyman Demirel declared that he was glad commonsense 
had prevailed and he thanked all those concerned for acting with 
caution and sensitivity. Prime Minister Ciller noted too, that she had 
kept her promise to the nation in that Turkey had not lost "even a 
pebble" in the very volatile confrontation. Ciller also thanked 
everyone for staying cool at a time when issues were growing hotter 
by the minute. Once negotiations over the ownership of the islands 
have begun, the way will be open for other issues concerning the 
Aegean Sea to be taken up. Foreign Ministry spokesman Omer Akbel 
said yesterday that so far no reply had been forthcoming from Athens 
about opening up talks. The news from Athens is that the government 
there is in deep trouble, facing calls to resign and accusations that it 
was guilty of treason for compromising with Turkey. 
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Ciller also stated that Aegean is one of the most critical points of the world 
and that it was declared to the world that any Greek attempt of increasing the limit of 
territorial waters to 12 miles will be a casus belli (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1996a). 
 
3 February 1996 
In a press meeting, Prime Minister Ciller said: 
“The world has checked our national consciousness to the end. We 
have acted determinately. We have not made any concessions and 
eventually showed the power of Turkey. This event also has given the 
opportunity to put forward the arguments of Turkey”.  
 
The Foreign Minister Undersecretary Oymen, in his speech to Cumhuriyet, 
argued that the Foreign Ministry has never doubted about the Kardak Rocks’ status 
under Turkish sovereignty. AEJ (Association of European Journalists) criticized the 
Greek and Turkish journalists’ attitude in flags issue and stated that their job was to 
broadcast the news, not to create the news (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). 
 
5 February 1996 
  According to Turkish daily Sabah and as it is mentioned in the Turkish Press 
Review: 
Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal  said  over  the  weekend  that Greece  
had added to the tension between Turkey and Greece by creating an 
incident over the Kardak rocks. Baykal  added  that  Turkey had not  
been  looking for a confrontation  over  the  rocks,  and  had not 
sought either a political or diplomatic victory. Rather, Turkey had 
wanted a quick return to the earlier status quo, without taking the 
issue any further. 
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6 February 1996 
The tension in the Aegean once again tends to grow due to the Greek military 
and naval activities closer to Kardak Rocks. Turkish government tries to stay calm. In 
a press conference, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Akbel said “that as far as Turkey 
knew, the present situation was ‘not serious’ ”. On the other hand, the representatives 
of Chief of General Staff stated that “to avoid another crisis, the area was being very 
closely watched and measures were being taken to keep the situation in check”. The 
press notes that the crisis does not seem to be over for the Greeks as it is understood 
from the military activities of Greece in the region (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1996a). 
Concerning the military activities of Greeks, Baykal stated that the situation 
should be normalized and Greece should also spend efforts for that. Oymen 
mentioned the need for bilateral negotiations and stated that the Greek attempts 
against the interests of Turkey are not appropriate, and that Turkey expected Greece 
to accept the negotiation process (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). 
 
7 February 1996 
Turkish Foreign Minister stated that there was an artificial crisis and the issue 
should be concluded. He said: “Turkey will do all it can for a constructive and just 
solution … I hope the way Turkey behaved during the crisis has given the whole 
region a message regarding the Turkish attitude”. He added that Turkey, concerning 
its interests in any situation, “would not accept any fait accompli in the Aegean”. 
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Once again, Akbel emphasized: “Turkey believes the best way to solve the problems 
is through talks. We are always open to talks”. He also mentioned the attitude of 
Ankara towards the EU’s position in the case of “Greek threats to block EU aid to 
Turkey”: “The EU is committed to providing financial assistance to Turkey. This is 
essential for the Customs Union. … We expect the EU to continue to act according to 
its contractual obligations” (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b). 
As it is mentioned in Turkish Press Review (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1996b), Milliyet informs about the US opinion on Greek attitude during and after the 
crisis:  
US political circles are disturbed by the negative attitude of Greece 
towards American attempts to mediate for a lasting solution to Turco-
Greek disputes. … Washington is worried about the fact that US 
mediation, in the case of a possible new crisis, has become almost 
impossible after the negative reaction of Greece. The US fears 
uncontrolled escalations of the increasing tension in the region. 
Furthermore, US officials tend to interpret Greek attempts to bring in 
EU mediation as a move against Ankara, and Washington is 
suspicious about the effectiveness of a mediator not trusted by both 
sides in the dispute. Washington’s attitude is simply that NATO will 
not remain passive in the event of a new crisis. US officials also stress 
that with the last developments, a vital chance for finding a solution 
to the Cyprus question was lost.   
 
The US President, on the other hand, congratulated Turkish Prime Minister    
Ciller in his letter, as it is stated in Turkish Press Review of Hurriyet and Milliyet 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b): 
I congratulate you for your efforts towards a peaceful end to the crisis 
over the Kardak islets…You and your government have showed a 
moderation and statesmanship in eliminating a conflict that could 
harm the security of the whole region. 
 
 
 74
9 February 1996 
News appeared on Milliyet and noted in Turkish Press Review concerning the 
EU attitude of the crisis. The EU emphasized the significance of preserving peaceful 
relations between Turkey and Greece and supported judicial solutions to the 
problems. The officials of the European Commission “expressed their support for 
Greece”, whereas the European Council, the final decision-making body of the EU, 
has not yet expressed its opinion.  
 
11 February 1996 
Foreign Minister Baykal, in his speech to Cumhuriyet, stated that the operation 
of Nimble Paw did not have any provocative aspect (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1996a). 
 
12 February 1996 
Following the Greek military exercises after the crisis, Turkey also started to 
carry out training programs in the region. The Turkish Review Press (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1996b), upon the news of Cumhuriyet states that according to the 
military sources, these military and naval exercises had already been planned for 
some time and they were routine training exercises and had “nothing to do” with the 
recent crisis. The two sides are careful observing the developments in the region. 
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13 February 1996 
According to the reviewed news from Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Hurriyet 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b) Turkey is starting a diplomatic initiative this 
week “in order to explain the Turkish position on the Kardak Rocks”. Following a 
security meeting13, Prime Minister Ciller stated that Kardak crisis demonstrated the 
possibility of a similar crisis in the region. She said, “There is the need to take up the 
issue of the Aegean as a whole, and to start the dialogue on the subject of islets and 
rocks whose status is not clear”. She mentioned that the fact that Turkey would like to 
have friendly relations with Greece did not mean that it would renounce its rights in 
the Aegean Sea. As a part of this diplomatic initiative, the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister will make visits in European countries including Italy, London, Belgium in 
order to meet NATO and EU officials. Akbel told that the purpose of these visits did 
not only cover Kardak issue, but also other issues of Turkish foreign policy. 
Concerning the Turkish military exercises in the Aegean: 
Akbel denied that a series of Turkish exercises in the Aegean and the 
Mediterranean were “a provocation” at a sensitive time. “I do not see 
anything provocative about a previously-scheduled exercise” the 
spokesman said. He said that the Greek side had been informed of the 
military exercise, scheduled to take place between February 12 and 
16. “These military exercises, called Nimble Paw (Cevik Pence), will 
be carried out in Turkish waters and international waters” he said, 
adding that the exercises would take place at nine different locations. 
While the Greek media continued to cover the military exercise as a 
“Turkish provocation”, Greek Defence Minister Gerassimos Arsenis 
said Greece had been informed of the military exercise, which was a 
scheduled and routine one. “It creates no threat” he said. Meanwhile, 
Greek Armed Forces are holding a military exercise “Egialos 2/96”.   
The Greek Defence Ministry said that the exercise would continue     
until 16 February. 
 
                                                 
13 The participants to this meeting were “Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, Deputy Chief of General Staff 
Gen. Cevik Bir, Secretary-General of the National Security Council Gen. Ilhan Kilic, Prime Ministry 
Undersecretary Arif Yuksel, Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Ambassador Onur Oymen, Chief 
Advisor of the Prime Ministry Murat Sungar and military officials and technocrats from  the  foreign 
ministry”. 
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According to the EU discussions on Kardak, the EP (European Parliament) is 
for the peaceful solution of the problem according to international agreements in order 
to prevent possible tensions between either Turkey and Greece or Turkey and the EU. 
 
14 February 1996 
As stated in the Turkish Press Review (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b), it 
appeared in Sabah that “The Press Advisor of the Turkish Embassy in Washington, 
Bulent Erdemgil, in a letter to the New York Times said that the intransigent Greek 
attitude led to the Kardak Crisis”. He stated that the concern was related to preventing 
Greek to make the Aegean Sea a Greek Lake. Erdemgil also noted that Greek did not 
consider international law and rejected bilateral negotiations.  
The draft reports of the EP, which constitutes the subject matter of the urgent 
issues debate on the following day, supports Greeks. They claim that “Turkey 
threatened Greek sovereignty during the Kardak island dispute because in reality the 
islands belong to Greece. As a response, Turkish Foreign Minister Baykal stated that 
the EU should be impartial in this issue; he added that the crisis emerged due to the 
inexistence of legal documents determining the exact borders between Turkey and 
Greece in the Aegean (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996). The US stated its opinion 
on Kardak issue and supported Greek proposal of carrying the issue to “International 
Tribunal”. Clinton, in his message to American Hellenic Educational Protective 
Association (AHEPA) said, “I want to assure you that the US strongly supports the 
principle of respect for international treaties, for internationally recognized borders 
and for territorial integrity”. He added that the two sides should resolve the disputes 
peacefully.  
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15 February 1996 
The EP made a draft decision criticizing the Turkish attitude in the crisis. 
According to the decision, Turkey is regarded as questioning the sovereignty rights of 
an EU member and demanding territory. The EP claims that Kardak Rocks are 
included within Greek territories according to Lausanne Treaty, the 1932 Treaty 
between Turkey and Italy and the 1947 Paris Treaty. The Deputy Undersecretary of 
Turkish Foreign Ministry responded that none of the valid documents in the related 
treaties proves that Kardak Rocks belong to Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1996a).  
 
16 February 1996 
Greece responded to the 29 January note verbale of Turkey, and rejected the 
Turkish proposal of negotiations on the grounds that there is no legal document 
proving Turkish claims and emphasized that Kardak Rocks belonged to Greece 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a).  
 
17-22 February 1996 
In various European meetings, Turkish Prime minister and Foreign Minister 
expressed the position and arguments of Turkey and expected the solution of the 
problems through bilateral negotiations with Greece. They also reminded the officials 
of the EU the obligations of the Union regarding the customs union (Office of the 
Prime Minister, 1996a). 
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26 February 1996 
Ankara called the Turkish ambassador to Greece, Umit Pamir. The 
ambassador firstly discussed the issue with Foreign Minister Baykal and Foreign 
Ministry Undersecretary Onur Oymen. He will also talk with other foreign ministry 
officials. In a meeting of the EU, the foreign ministers will discuss the relations 
between Turkey and Greece. According to EU reports, the Union is not comfortable 
with Greek attitude of influencing EU thinking about Turkey through its veto threat. 
The Turkish Permanent Representative to the EU, Uluc Ozulker stated that The EU 
should eventually stop yielding to Greek demands and it should implement economic 
pressures on Greece (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). 
 
27 February 1996   
During the meetings, the EU demanded from Greece to “fulfill its obligations 
regarding Turkey” within the context of customs union obligations and called for 
dialogue. Ciller, on her way to visit EU’s term president, Italy, stated “I will explain 
the term president of the EU Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Greece in various bilateral 
conflicts”. She regarded the Greek attitude of blocking the EU financial assistance to 
Turkey as “unjust” and an “abuse of Greek membership in the Union. She said: “We 
search for friends in the region but it is out of question that Ankara will let Greece 
violate Turkish rights … Turkey cannot be left in the waiting room. It is time for 
Turkey to receive its place and status”. Following the meetings, the Italian officials 
mentioned the support of Italy to Turkey (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996b). 
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About the return date of Turkish ambassador to Greece, Akbel said that it was 
not clear, and he said: “Greece is trying to undermine Turkish interests in a number of 
ways. Turkey will retaliate in a reciprocal manner” (Office of the Prime Minister, 
1996b). 
 
28 February 1996 
According to the Turkish Ministry statement as it appeared on Turkish Press 
Review (Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b) “Turkey welcomes the 
reaffirmation of the EU’s fourteen members to carry out their obligations to Turkey 
within the framework of customs union agreement”, opposing the Greek claims. 
Turkey is preparing for increased diplomatic pressure on EU. President Clinton, in his 
letter to Ciller, stated that the EU should remain faithful to its pledges to Turkey and 
mentioned his pleasure about calmness of Turkey and Greece during and after the 
crisis. The US also supports the dialogue proposal of Turkey to resolve the disputes 
with Greece (Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b). 
 
29 February 1996 
The Foreign Ministry officials stated that Turkish Ambassador Pamir would 
return to Greece and launch a “program of political and diplomatic pressure on 
Greece. He explained the details of this program to President Demirel. The program 
had been discussed in the NSC. There are mainly four targets of the program 
(Directorate General of Press and Information, 1996b): 
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Turkey will press for satisfaction in connection with the rights of the 
Turkish minority living in Thrace,  and  will  demonstrate  how 
Athens  has  ignored  past  agreements  made  to  deal with this 
sensitive issue. The problems of Turkish families living on Aegean 
islands belonging to Greece will also be brought to international 
platforms. Thirdly, Ankara will also bring up the matter of how 
Greece is quietly arming islands in the Aegean in contravention of 
international agreements. Along with this, air corridors and coastal 
limits will be taken up. Pressure against Greece will be increased by 
developing existing agreements with Albania and Macedonia. There 
have already been suggestions that Turkey wants joint military 
exercises with those two countries, that both back onto Greece. 
British Foreign Minister, in his speech to journalists mentioned the opinion of 
London against Greek attitude of implementing political and diplomatic aggression on 
Turkey. He also stated that EU-Turkey relations should not be influenced from the 
disputes between Turkey and Greece. (Directorate General of Press and Information, 
1996b) 
 
4.2.2 Elements of the Crisis 
It has been mentioned that constitutive elements of a crisis situation are as 
follows: 
• the historical roots of the crisis,  
• the existence of a threat to the national interests of the state, 
• the necessity to respond in a limited time, 
• the probability of a military conflict and  
• the need for preserving the interests or the position of the state within 
the region/international system. 
The historical past between Turkey and Greece constitutes another background 
for the emergence and management of the crisis. This first element exists as a source 
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of perceptions between Turkey and Greece in Kardak crisis. The historical origin of 
these perceptions influenced the attitude of Turkey during the crisis. 14 
 Another element is the existence of a threat to the national interests of Turkey 
during the crisis. This was a threat to the territorial integrity of the country as Kardak 
Rocks represented the sensitiveness of Turkey about any claims on Turkish territory.  
 Like many security crises, Turkey tried to act rapidly but cautiously as it 
responded to the emergence of the crisis.  The government and the military experts 
formulated their strategies in a limited time. The leaders had urgent security meetings 
often held by the NSC.15 
A possible escalation of the crisis would mean a military confrontation with 
serious consequences. A war between the two states would mean a war between two 
NATO members. This would have serious repercussions both in terms of the balances 
in the region and the international system. Both sides were aware that there was a very 
thin line between peace and war. For this reason, the crisis did not escalate into war 
despite the probability of a serious military conflict. 
Each state has certain national interests which are inherent in its national 
security culture. The position of Turkey within the international system and the 
characteristics of its national security culture require it to act in a certain way during 
the crisis. Although it seemed to be a dilemma of balancing the interests between 
peace and war, the priority given to the territorial integrity of the country, the 
decisiveness in the case of a possible military confrontation, the deterrent behaviors 
                                                 
14 This issue has been examined in section 4.1.3.1 The historical experiences as a source of 
perceptions. 
15 More details about the response of Turkey to the crisis can be traced from the section of 4.2.1 The 
Chain of Events. 
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against the other side’s possible attack as well as the balance and peace within the 
region, Turkey managed the crisis in conformity with its national security culture. 
 
4.2.3 The Symbolic Aspects of Kardak Crisis 
“Kardak Rocks form a symbol” in terms of its advantages in political and legal 
terms for the party who obtained their sovereignty. Given the low economic or 
geographical importance attached to Kardak, this point was difficult to understand for 
the outsiders. For them, Kardak Rocks do not worth to come to the brink of war. 
Some even interpreted the situation as weird or ridiculous (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 
2). Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997: 374) consider Kardak dispute as a minicrisis and 
an evidence of continuing unresolved crises between Turkey and Greece. However, 
Kardak crisis was a sign that Turkish-Greek relations were worsening further since 
the end of the Cold War. If such crises are not paid enough attention and avoided in 
time, they may turn out to be major crises (Stearns, 2001: 239-240). 
In the case of Greek sovereignty over the Rocks, the territorial waters and 
further claims of Greece over the disputed islands, islets and rocks would increase at 
the expense of Turkey. Moreover, the maritime boundary in Aegean will legally 
become certain. Greece presents this as the western boundary of Turkey and the 
eastern boundary of Europe (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 2-3). 
According to Turkish approach, Kardak rocks are an integral part of the 
Aegean Sea which has a sui generis character with geographical and historical 
peculiarities. Consequently, only Turkey and Greece can overcome the complexities 
of the issue through negotiations rather than letting a third party involve in it. On the 
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other hand, Greek approach considers Aegean as a Greek lake and Greece is unwilling 
to ‘share’ it with “the other riparian state Turkey (Inan and Baseren, 1997: 10). 
In 1990s, Turkey developed its national security policies to demonstrate itself 
as a strong regional power initiating and participating in international peace 
operations particularly in the Balkans (Guvenc, 1998: 136; Uzgel, 1998: 436; Kazan, 
2005: 592-593). It also tried to decrease its dependency in defense industry as a 
response to Greek efforts of armament and in order to maintain the balance in the 
Aegean in its favor. Kardak Crisis has one of the incidents which gave Turkey the 
opportunity to prove that if necessary it has the power and will to use force in order to 
preserve its vital national interests, risking having problems with the Western allies. 
In this sense, by launching a military operation on its own, Turkey realized its military 
purposes in Kardak Crisis (Guvenc, 1998: 136, 147, 155-157). 
 
4.2.4 Post-Crisis Period 
In 1990s, the military in Turkey was highly interested in a possible “deviation 
from state policy towards Greece and Cyprus”. In 1995, the prime minister of the 
time, Tansu Ciller was inclined to “make concessions over Cyprus in order to secure a 
Customs Union agreement with the EU”. According to an interview with then the 
head of the navy, Admiral Guven Erkaya in Istanbul in October 1998 (Jenkins, 2001: 
78): 
In January 1996 the TGS was further alarmed by Ciller’s naivety and 
adventurism when Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war over 
the disputed Aegean islet of Imia/Kardak. During an emergency 
meeting to discuss a Greek landing on the islet, Ciller first asked 
whether it belonged to Turkey and, after being told that it did, 
proposed sending in troops and expelling the Greeks by force. She 
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was informed by the head of the navy, Admiral Guven Erkaya, that 
such an operation would be tantamount to a declaration of war against 
Greece and was persuaded to land Turkish commandos on a nearby 
islet whose sovereignty was not in dispute. 
 
As it is stated in an interview made with a MFA officer in January 1997, after 
convincing Greece “to withdraw its troops under pressure from Washington” the crisis 
was settled. More significantly, the pace of events in the crisis proved that the policies 
towards Greece and Cyprus were under the control of the NSC and this was ensured 
by the TGS (Jenkins, 2001: 79). 
On 8 July 1997, in NATO Summit in Madrid, the foreign ministers of the two 
states were hosted by the US Secretary Albright. At the end of the meeting the two 
states “reached a convergence of views on a basis for promoting better relations” 
(Bolukbasi, 2004: 73-74; British American Security Information Council): 
- A mutual commitment to peace, security and the continuing       
  development of good neighborly relations; 
- Respect for each other’s sovereignty;  
- Respect for the principles of international law and international    
   agreements; 
- Respect for each other’s legitimate, vital interests and concerns in the  
  Aegean which are of great importance for their security and national    
  sovereignty; 
- Commitment to refrain from unilateral acts on the basis of mutual  
   respect and willingness to avoid conflicts arising from   
   misunderstanding; and 
- Commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means based on mutual   
   consent and without use of force or threat of force. 
 
In 1997, the NSDP outlined “the primary foreign and domestic threats to 
Turkey”: The foreign threats as “Greece” and “The South (meaning Syria/Iraq)”. The 
Document warned about a possible “military clash with Greece” which would 
consequently lead to further fronts with other neighbors such as Syria. The domestic 
threats were complicating the security environment of the country (Jenkins, 2001: 48).  
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Kardak crisis was resolved; although the root causes of the problem still exist. 
However, Turkey has made efforts in the resolution of the conflicts through peaceful 
means in line with its policies of enhancing peace, stability and mutual trust within 
the region (Sihmantepe, 2002). In the following years of Kardak Crisis, the military 
continued to be cautious towards Greece despite the rapprochement between two 
states as a result of 1999 earthquake in Turkey and the improvements in the dialogues 
between the foreign ministers. While for Greece “the definition of the continental 
shelf” was the sole problem, for Turkey, the “differences over mineral exploration 
rights, airspace, Greece’s right to extend its territorial waters and the ownership of a 
number of Aegean islets” had to be discussed (Jenkins, 2001: 79).  
A possible military confrontation between Turkey and Greece in Kardak crisis 
would have serious negative impact on the security of Eastern Mediterranean as well 
as on the image of NATO “as an effective security manager in the region”. This 
explains the interests of EU and NATO in supporting reconciliation between Turkey 
and Greece. However, it should be noted that the “Greek-Turkish rapprochement is 
fragile” with continuing misperceptions and misunderstandings and in the absence of 
“goodwill and a willingness” (Larrabee, 2001: 235, 237). Although, the existing status 
quo in the Aegean remains the resources of the Sea unexplored, in the near future a 
regime uniting the parties seems difficult to implement in the absence of mutual 
confidence (Stearns, 2001: 243). 
Today, the positions of the two sides are not different from the past in essence 
(Ayman, 1998; 288), although Turkey and Greece seems to have a smooth 
functioning relationship. The lack of permanent agreements over a number of Aegean 
disputes leaves the future ambiguous. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 How Turkey Managed the Crisis and the Role of Turkish National  
Security Culture 
Considering the given information on Turkish-Greek Relations, the details of 
the crisis, and the attitude of the Turkish side in managing the crisis, it is possible to 
assess the role of national security culture in Kardak Crisis and how Turkey acted in 
accordance with its national security culture. 
 During the period of Kardak Crisis, TAF and NSC had a considerable 
influence on the foreign policy decisions concerning national security issues including 
Turkish-Greek relations. This is particularly evident during 1990s’ coalition 
governments which struggled in foreign policy due to their domestic policy interests 
as well as lack of information or willingness in managing national security issues. At 
the initial stage of the crisis, Prime Minister Ciller surprisingly stated that there were 
no documents in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the legal 
status of Kardak Rocks. This statement damaged the reliability of the Turkish thesis. 
At the initial stage of the crisis, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the TAF, Turkey’s diplomatic reaction to Greece remained insufficient. 
Nevertheless, later on legal documents such as treaties and land registrations were 
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cited by various officials to support the Turkish claims. In this sense, the diplomatic 
responses were insufficient at this initial stage of the crisis as the government did not 
pay enough attention to the security experts both from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the TAF. The ruling political party in the government presented an image that it 
used this international security crisis for its domestic political interests (Aksu, 2001). 
One of the interesting points about the Kardak Crisis was that neither NATO 
nor the EU countries realized the rapidly escalating crisis until it nearly exploded. 
This raised questions about the “exchange of information between civilian and 
military leadership in both countries. Hickok (2001: 39, 45) describes this situation: 
The Turkish General Staff responded to the build-up of Greek forces 
near Imia/Kardak by sending the Turkish navy to sea. By the 29th one 
Meko-class frigate, two missile boats, and two patrol boats were 
cruising toward the islet. Another frigate was in route but still north 
of the immediate area. The military was reacting to a rapidly 
changing military condition just off its coast without a clear 
understanding of the diplomatic and political context. Moreover, the 
senior officials recognized that Prime Minister Ciller’s caretaker 
government was likely to offer only weak support and guidance given 
the domestic political situation. … Articles [in Turkish press] on the 
difficulties between Turkey and Greece focused on the Cyprus 
problem and on the impending visit from United States Assistant 
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke with little to mention of the 
rising confrontation over Imia/Kardak. Ciller further confused the 
state of civilian leadership in Ankara in an interview with a hard line 
nationalist newspaper. She indicated that she was prepared to take her 
party into opposition against an Islamist coalition. On the eve of an 
expanding military crisis, the Turkish prime minister declared 
publicly her willingness to abdicate her office to an Islamist prime 
minister, badly undercutting her authority and credibility as events 
began to unfold. Moreover, it raised a suspicion among senior 
military officers that her council over the next few days was guided 
more by domestic political calculations than Turkish national 
interests. 
 
Furthermore, when Ankara realized that it had the military capability to deal 
with the situation, they started to disregard the outside mediations. “Internal 
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miscommunications about political objective and military means hampered effective 
crisis management and, in fact, increased the pace of the conflict” (Hickok, 2001: 47).  
The Turkish military proved competent in avoiding an extreme reaction 
against what it considered as a provocation by Greece. The crisis left the military 
“with a renewed boldness in foreign affairs”. Because, during the crisis the senior 
military officers sorted out possible policy alternatives and passed the issue to the 
civilians to provide justification of the determined policy (Hickok, 2001: 49-50).  
In Kardak crisis, the ignorance of the US about the roots of the dispute 
revealed itself in the difficulty of controlling the escalation of the crisis. This led to 
the idea that in the coming crises the outside intervention might be rejected. 
Moreover, one of the lessons of the crisis was that “unilateral military actions 
followed by an immediate call to negotiate put the opposite side at a diplomatic 
disadvantage in the international fora” (Hickok, 2001: 50-51).  
Both sides preferred to use naval forces as a navy is slower and more suitable 
for deterrence and preventing the escalation of the crisis. Moreover, commanding the 
naval forces is relatively easy, which makes it easier to control the escalation of the 
crisis. Turkey’s main position during the crisis is in line with this military strategy 
which demonstrated the caution to avoid a military confrontation. However, as it was 
mentioned by Kramer (1991:60, 70), Turkey showed its decisiveness through 
“demonstrative acts and/or threats” maintaining a balance of interests while at the 
same time offering negotiations at almost every stage of the crisis. In this sense, the 
crisis management can be regarded as successful as both sides agreed on “no ships, no 
men, no flags” (Raftapoulos, 1997: 427) and the crisis ended without a war or a 
concession. Nevertheless, the status of the Rocks was left for further negotiations. 
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Having examined the national security culture of Turkey and the attitude of 
Turkey in Kardak Crisis, it can be argued that the Turkish government relied on the 
basic characteristics of its national security culture during crisis management. The 
military, as one of the basic state institutions (together with MFA) undertaking the 
responsibility of preserving and transferring the characteristics of national security 
culture had acted in line with its mission as usual in international security crises. 
Moreover, the civilian leaders of the country, the public opinion and the media proved 
themselves as attaching great importance to the basic and sensitive features of Turkish 
national security culture during crisis management. The Turkish media was very 
concerned about the chain of events, discussed the crisis and even became a part of 
the issue by removing and placing flags on the Kardak Rocks. It is possible that some 
members of the press were interested in the crisis merely for their personal or 
organizational gains, though it is difficult to prove that. However, regardless of their 
intentions, what they emphasized were the sensitive issues pointed out also by the 
political leaders of the country. The declarations of political leaders reveal that they 
adjusted their attitude both according to the reactions coming from the experienced 
MFA personnel and military elites; and their domestic political interests influenced by 
the public opinion and the media. A broader analysis on Turkish media and public 
opinion during the crisis can demonstrate how they give priority to dominant features 
of security culture. 
During the crisis, the leaders used the crisis bargaining codes or managed the 
crisis through their cognitive mechanism while formulating the strategies. In other 
words, they relied on their previous experiences as a guideline while processing the 
information before making a decision. For this case, the cognitive prism is composed 
of the threat perceptions during the crisis (the threat to the territorial integrity of the 
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country) and the beliefs about the intentions of the adversary (claims of Greece on 
Turkish territory). While making a decision, Turkey had to keep a balance between 
conflict and cooperation, war and peace during the crisis through these codes. The 
deterrence and negotiation were the basic tools that Turkey relied on as a product of 
its national security culture which has different elements.  
 
 
5.1.1 Striking a balance between conflict and cooperation: Balancing 
between different elements of Turkey’s security culture during crisis 
management 
 
 Nation states, as the actors of the international system have to deal with 
multiple security problems all the time. These problems intensify during periods of 
crisis. International security crises are critical points for states’ national interests. 
They need reliable sources to guide them for a successful crisis management. This 
study has asserted that national security culture serves as the guideline for states in 
crisis management. This role can be performed through the intentional efforts of those 
institutions responsible from the preservation or transfer of the inherent characteristics 
of this culture.  
In Turkey, this process can be observed in the role of certain institutions such 
as the military and the MFA. In this study, the role of military in foreign and security 
policies has been examined with reference to its historical significance in terms of 
Turkish national security culture. The policy makers who have been socialized within 
this security culture act accordingly while making decisions and interpreting the 
security matters. This fact is not invalidated with possible manipulations by 
politicians or any actor using the sensitive elements of this culture for their own 
benefit. One can observe this process more obviously in crisis management as the 
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crises times suggest a high degree of caution, decisiveness and urgency. In such 
situations, the states would rely on their national security culture in order to overcome 
the security crisis in the least frightening way possible. 
The study has also examined the Kardak Crisis as the case reflecting the 
significance of national security culture in a crisis situation. During the Kardak Crisis, 
the declarations of leaders in the government pointed out the priorities of Turkey. 
These were in line with the national security culture of Turkey. Basically, the 
historical experiences of the country with Greece were the framework of Turkey’s 
attitude in the crisis. The threat perceptions shaped since the establishment of the 
country and the significance attached to peace and security at domestic and 
international levels have led the country to prioritize the status quo within the region 
and deterrence as the pillars of foreign and security policy. We can observe this in 
Kardak crisis where Turkey decisively applied both deterrence with its military and 
the will for bilateral negotiations in order to manage the crisis in a peaceful way. In 
other words, it tried to keep a balance between conflict and cooperation by balancing 
different elements of its security culture. The NSC meetings highlighted the necessity 
of behaving cautiously in order not to cause a war with Greece, but also deterring 
Greece to act against the national interests of Turkey. In the management of the crisis 
it was observed that the political leaders, the high level, MFA personnel, the military 
elites in the end behaved in conformity after long discussions about the reaction of 
Turkey to the crisis. We can understand this from the press release of the NSC 
(Secretariat General of the National Security Council, 1996) after the crisis on 31 
January 1996. The Council stated that during the events, it observed with great 
pleasure that the determined and supreme attitude of all institutions and organizations 
of the state in defending the sovereignty rights of Turkey as well as the support of the 
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public to the national policies resulted in a common sense among the country. 
Similarly, President Demirel said that escalation of the crisis has been overcome with 
common sense. Prime Minister Ciller mentioned that “the issue was handled with 
determinacy and the results were taken” (Office of the Prime Minister, 1996a). This 
conformity was provided with the impact of national security culture. 
The Turkish attitude and effort of keeping a balance between conflict and 
cooperation takes its roots from the different elements of its security culture. The 
main drivers of Turkish national security culture, namely the historical experiences as 
a source of perceptions, the NATO membership and the role of military as a part of its 
national identity within the international system determined how it acted during crisis 
management. Turkey as a part of a security community and an active member of 
NATO with a powerful and deterrent military, willing for various international 
cooperation and peace arrangements, has a key role both in its region and where the 
crises emerge in different parts of the world. This demonstrates its responsibility in 
international security issues and its choice of national identity within the international 
system. When these elements interplay, in a possible international security crisis, 
Turkey seems to face a challenging task of striking a balance between defending its 
interests through cooperation and showing its decisiveness about any defense acts 
through military deterrence. Although it seems like a hard and complicated task, this 
is a natural consequence of its national security culture which is composed of a 
complex set of elements. I attempted to point out merely a limited number of these 
factors which are dominant in Turkish national security culture.   
The thesis has also pointed out the relevance and use of cultural factors in 
understanding the security policies of states particularly in terms of their behaviors 
during crisis management. The national security culture of a state is usually shaped by 
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the historical experiences and the inherent characteristics within the national identity, 
the national character and the turning point events during the establishment of the 
state. These characteristics vary from one state to another and depend on the cases. 
This constitutes the differences for the security cultures of each country. For this 
reason, examination of particular security cultures may help us understand different 
modes of behaviors of states in the same situation or crisis. In fact, a comparative 
study on the respective national security cultures of two states in a crisis would reveal 
a better explanation on their use in crisis management studies. Therefore, further 
studies on the relation between national security culture and crisis management as 
well as the role of national security culture in security policies would contribute to 
understanding the security policies of states. This would in turn constitute a 
framework for increasing opportunities of agreement and understanding between 
states, and consequently contribute to international security. 
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